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A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES AND ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS
REBECCA E. WOLITZ*
Controversies regarding the pricing of biopharmaceutical products are 
pervasive. Patients must choose between treatment and rent, prescriptions go 
unfilled, and health systems are forced to restrict access to life-saving medications—
all because of cost. Though there is often consensus that these issues are 
problematic, there is disagreement as to what are appropriate solutions and who has 
responsibility to bring about those solutions. Most efforts to address 
biopharmaceutical pricing concerns focus on governmental regulation. This Article 
has a different focus. It provides a legal and normative analysis of a form of 
corporate self-regulation that could help address access and pricing concerns—a
moral “corporate duty to rescue” (CDTR). Scholars in health law, business ethics, 
and bioethics have proposed that a CDTR applies to biopharmaceutical companies 
regarding access to their products. Rescue efforts are conceived as including product 
donations, price reductions, or tinkering with intellectual property management. 
This Article advances three primary arguments. First, analyzing pertinent law and 
principles, it argues that corporate managers and directors have the legal discretion 
to discharge a CDTR. Second, while there is legal discretion to discharge a CDTR, 
this Article argues that it is unclear what this moral duty demands of 
biopharmaceutical companies. Its application to the drug pricing and access context 
is not straightforward, morally speaking. Third, this Article argues that focus on a 
CDTR in the biopharmaceutical context, in some instances, may be misplaced. A 
duty to rescue allocates responsibility for rescue on the basis of who can help now 
and not on the basis of who has historically done what. Yet, wronging others 
generates significant reasons for the mitigation of that wrong to be the wrongdoer’s 
special moral responsibility. If there is culpable conduct, focus on a CDTR will fail 
to hold companies accountable, thereby obfuscating morally problematic corporate 
conduct. As access and pricing problems are at root normative, this Article 
contributes to larger debates both about what drug manufacturers owe patients 
regarding product access as well as what sorts of self-regulatory changes they 
justifiably could be urged to implement.
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INTRODUCTION
Controversies regarding the pricing of prescription medications are pervasive. 
Cross-cutting jurisdictional boundaries and disease types, the purportedly high cost 
and unaffordability of medications dominate the news cycle.1 Pricing controversies 
have been of particular recent prominence in the United States. Patients are forced to 
choose between treatment and rent,2 prescriptions go unfilled,3 and health systems 
restrict access to life-saving medications4—all because of cost. Individuals like 
Martin Shkreli and companies like Gilead Sciences, Inc., have become notable 
names. The former became infamous for dramatically raising the price of a decades-
old lifesaving medication,5 the latter for launching a series of innovative hepatitis C 
                                                                                                            
1. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-
PATENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS,
TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 7 (2016) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON AGING REPORT] (describing price-gouging practices utilized for off-patent therapies); 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (Comm. Print 2015) [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE REPORT] (discussing 
pricing of treatments for the hepatitis C virus (HCV) and impact on ability to treat those 
affected); ELLEN ‘T HOEN, OXFAM INT’L, ACCESS TO CANCER TREATMENT: A STUDY OF 
MEDICINE PRICING ISSUES WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO CANCER 
MEDICATION (2015), http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/access-to-cancer
-treatment-a-study-of-medicine-pricing-issues-with-recommendati-344070 [https://perma
.cc/MP6C-KVW3] (noting access and pricing issues worldwide with cancer therapies); Lisa 
L. Gill, How to Pay Less for Your Meds, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/how-to-pay-less-for-your-meds [https://perma
.cc/CS9S-SMPD]; Ed Silverman, Italy Proposes the WHO Set International Standards for 
Drug-Pricing Transparency, STAT (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.statnews.com
/pharmalot/2019/02/14/italy-who-drug-prices-transparency [https://perma.cc/JV8K-R7ZG].
2. Ann Killion, Season of Sharing: A Cancer Patient Finds Joy, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 9, 
2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Season-of-Sharing-A-cancer-
patient-finds-joy-12418126.php [https://perma.cc/V6FK-DQFY].
3. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A
NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 99 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass eds., 
2018) (ebook) [hereinafter MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE REPORT], https://www.nap
.edu/catalog/24946/making-medicines-affordable-a-national-imperative [https://perma.cc
/CH8D-DZXK]; see also SARA R. COLLINS, PETRA W. RASMUSSEN, MICHELLE M. DOTY &
SOPHIE BEUTEL, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE RISE IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND 
AFFORDABILITY SINCE HEALTH REFORM TOOK EFFECT 4 (2015), http://www
.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/jan/1800_collins
_biennial_survey_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV6C-4N9M] (noting, however, the number of 
unfilled prescriptions due to cost is down from twenty-seven percent in 2012 due to the 
increased number of Americans with insurance coverage).
4. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, State Medicaid Programs Continue to Restrict Access to 
Hepatitis C Drugs, STAT (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016
/11/14/medicaid-hepatitis-gilead [https://perma.cc/4D9W-K79T].
5. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGING REPORT, supra note 1, at 32–41 (describing Turing 
Pharmaceutical’s pricing of Daraprim which Martin Shkreli oversaw).
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therapies at prohibitively expensive prices.6 New examples of drug pricing 
controversies appear seemingly every day.7
Prescription drug costs have been called “the hardest” problem in health policy.8
While there is often consensus that these issues are problematic, there is significant 
disagreement as to what are appropriate solutions and who has responsibility to bring 
about those solutions. With some exceptions,9 nearly all current efforts to address the 
purportedly high costs and unaffordability of prescription medications focus on 
governmental regulation. At the federal level, for instance, President Trump released 
a “Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices” which includes the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) taking steps to close legal loopholes and address 
anticompetitive industry practices.10 At the state level, efforts include price 
regulation,11 regulation of the biopharmaceutical industry’s disclosure of pricing 
                                                                                                            
6. See generally SENATE FINANCE REPORT, supra note 1 (investigating Gilead’s pricing 
of its, at the time, new HCV medications).
7. See, e.g., Adam Feuerstein, A New Parkinson’s Drug Is a Long-Acting Version of a 
Cheap Generic. Should It Cost $30,000 a Year?, STAT (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/25/adamas-parkinsons-pricing [https://perma.cc/YR88-
ZZ9R] (describing controversy surrounding Gocovri, a “new” Parkinson’s drug that may not 
be all that new); Damian Garde, Pioneering Cancer Drug, Just Approved, to Cost $475,000–
–and Analysts Say It’s a Bargain, STAT (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.statnews.com
/2017/08/30/novartis-car-t-cancer-approved [https://perma.cc/3ATJ-4NX3] (describing 
anticipated cost of Novartis’ new CAR-T therapy); Eric Sagonowsky, Pfizer’s Prevnar 13 Set 
for Another Price Hike in 2018 as U.S. Price-Per-Dose Climbs Near $180 (Nov. 28, 2017, 
3:30 PM), FIERCEPHARMA, https://www.fiercepharma.com/vaccines/pfizer-s-prevnar-13-set
-for-another-price-hike-2018-as-u-s-price-per-dose-climbs-to-180 [https://perma.cc/U2NQ
-M9UA] (noting additional price increases planned for Pfizer’s popular pneumococcal 
vaccine).
8. Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs 
the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273 (2018).
9. For instance, some companies have undertaken voluntary initiatives to limit annual 
price increases. See, e.g., Press Release, Allergan, Allergan PLC Board of Directors Issues 
Statement on Company’s Social Contract with Patients (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www
.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/allergan-plc-board-of-directors-issues-statement-o
[https://perma.cc/R397-VT5B]; Our Social Contract with Patients, ALLERGAN CEO BLOG
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-social
-contract-with-patients [https://perma.cc/3HWN-TUKF].
10. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN PATIENTS FIRST: THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS
(2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf [https://perma.cc
/K593-VUES]; see also Scott Gottlieb, Reducing the Hurdles for Complex Generic Drug 
Development, FDA (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices
/ucm612010.htm [https://perma.cc/VR2A-T5X2].
11. Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
Maryland’s generic price-gouging law violates the dormant commerce clause), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019); Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (invalidating the District of Columbia’s attempt to regulate the prices of 
patented medicines).
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information, efforts to rein in costs through restrictions on payment,12 and legislation 
to facilitate drug importation.13
Governmental regulation is an important tool for addressing the problem of costly 
prescription medications, but this Article has a different focus. Scholars in health
law, business ethics, and bioethics have drawn on the widely discussed duty to rescue 
in the philosophical and legal literatures and proposed that biopharmaceutical 
companies are subject to a moral duty to rescue regarding access to their products.14
For ease of exposition, this Article refers to the application of a moral duty to rescue 
to for-profit companies as a “corporate duty to rescue.”15
Proposals for a corporate duty to rescue (CDTR) stand in contrast to and 
complement governmental regulatory efforts. A CDTR, as applied in the 
biopharmaceutical context, states that biopharmaceutical companies have a moral
obligation to increase access to medications. Rescue efforts are conceived as 
including in-kind donations to needy patients, reducing product prices, or tinkering 
with the management of a company’s intellectual property—for instance, by 
refraining from patent enforcement or engaging in licensing agreements. A CDTR 
offers a form of self-regulation. It is not a legal requirement. Rather, it presents a
moral foundation for corporate management to comport itself in a manner that could 
help address biopharmaceutical access and pricing concerns.
The biopharmaceutical industry has a bad reputation.16 It is frequently and 
consistently perceived as behaving unethically, and this perception specifically 
applies to issues of product access and pricing.17 Yet, robust public perception aside, 
the morals of the matter are not obvious. What are the ethical obligations of 
biopharmaceutical companies regarding product access and pricing? Further, if there 
are obligations, are they compatible with existing legal frameworks?
As access and pricing problems are at root normative, getting increased clarity on 
these questions is a national imperative. And, while ethical analysis is important for 
                                                                                                            
12. Alan M. Kirschenbaum & David C. Gibbons, 2017: A Banner Year for State Laws on 
Drug Pricing, Price Reporting, and Discounting, FDA L. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2017),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/11/2017-a-banner-year-for-state-laws-on-drug-pricing-price
-reporting-and-discounting [https://perma.cc/L58F-UENJ].
13. Ctr. for State Rx Drug Pricing, Vermont First in the Nation to Approve Rx Drug 
Importation from Canada, NASHP, https://nashp.org/vermont-legislature-first-in-the-nation
-to-approve-rx-drug-importation-from-canada [https://perma.cc/8LLB-5FK2].
14. See infra note 20 (collecting citations). The term “biopharmaceutical” is used 
throughout this Article as a shorthand referring to both pharmaceuticals and biologics. 
Likewise, use of the term “companies” is intended in its generic sense and not as referring 
specifically to limited liability companies. The legal analysis provided in Section II.B 
specifically concerns corporations.
15. Others have used similar terminology. Cf. Julian Friedland, Sustainability, Public 
Health, and the Corporate Duty to Assist, 34 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 215 (2015) (describing a 
corporate duty to assist); Kevin T. Jackson, Global Distributive Justice and the Corporate 
Duty to Aid, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 547 (1993) (discussing a corporate duty to assist); Stepan Wood, 
The Case for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights Responsibility, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 63 
(2012) (discussing corporations and the moral duty to rescue or aid).
16. Mark Kessel, Restoring the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Reputation, 32 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 983 (2014).
17. Id.
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crafting informed laws, given the often slow pace of regulatory change, it is also 
crucial for assessing potential mechanisms of reform operating outside of 
government action. This Article contributes to these larger conversations by 
analyzing and critiquing a set of proposals that occupy a corner of the ethical 
landscape. By critically examining a corporate duty to rescue, specifically in the 
biopharmaceutical context, this Article contributes to the debates both about what 
drug manufacturers might owe patients as well as what sorts of self-regulatory 
changes they justifiably could be urged to implement. 
This Article makes three primary arguments. First, from a legal perspective, it 
analyzes applicable law and principles and argues that though a moral CDTR is 
unlikely to be enforceable as a tort, managers and directors do have the legal 
discretion to discharge this duty on behalf of a corporation. Such discretion is not 
only compatible with shareholder primacy theories of corporate governance, but 
discharging a CDTR will likely be protected by the business judgment rule. Further, 
some rescue efforts may even be costless or beneficial to biopharmaceutical 
corporations.
Second, while discharging a CDTR is legally permissible, this Article argues that 
a critical examination of this moral duty reveals that what it demands of 
biopharmaceutical companies is undertheorized. As presented by its proponents, a 
CDTR has an initial, intuitive attractiveness. Systematic evaluation, however, 
demonstrates that moving from the paradigm duty to rescue case involving a 
drowning child to the corporate context introduces numerous moral complexities and 
sources of disanology. Critical examination reveals that application of a duty to 
rescue to the biopharmaceutical drug pricing and access context is not 
straightforward, morally speaking. 
Third, this Article argues that the CDTR is potentially vulnerable to a broader 
criticism. A duty to rescue either presumes no causal relationship or is agnostic about 
the relationship between the parties involved in a situation of rescue. By design, a 
moral duty to rescue allocates responsibility for rescue on the basis of who can help 
now and not on the basis of who has historically done what. Yet, wronging others 
generates significant reasons for the mitigation of that wrong to be the wrongdoer’s 
special moral responsibility. Drug pricing and access controversies have different 
features. Contextual features in the biopharmaceutical case are often relevant. Thus, 
there may be cases where patients are impeded from accessing or unable to access 
medications because biopharmaceutical companies have behaved in ways that make 
those companies responsible for that lack of access. If there is culpable corporate 
conduct, focus on a CDTR seems misplaced. Not only would it add insult to injury 
by casting companies in the light of rescuers as opposed to wrongdoers, it would fail 
to hold companies accountable, thereby obfuscating morally problematic corporate 
conduct.
This Article advances this argument in four Parts. Part I introduces proposals in 
the literature for a CDTR and traces their derivation from the paradigm duty to rescue 
case. Part II turns to the practical significance of CDTR proposals, analyzing 
applicable law and principles, and evaluating both their legal enforceability and legal 
permissibility. Part III, by providing concrete examples of the “rescue-like” activities 
that biopharmaceutical companies engage in, offers support for the argument that 
discharging a CDTR is legally permissible. It also demonstrates the necessity for 
further normative assessment as it is uncertain whether any of these activities actually 
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would count as discharging a company’s moral obligation. Part IV critically and 
systematically analyzes a CDTR. It examines the features of the paradigm rescue 
case and argues that contrary to first appearances, application of the duty to the 
biopharmaceutical context is far from straightforward and is subject to criticism.
I. A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE
A. Introducing a Corporate Duty to Rescue
A moral duty to rescue is not only familiar but enjoys immense intuitive support. 
Despite some variability, most commentators—whether philosophical or legal—
often mean by a duty to rescue an “easy” duty to rescue. Peter Singer, for example, 
famously illustrates this duty through the example of a drowning child: “[I]f I am 
walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and 
pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, 
while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”18
Though some believe that a duty to rescue may permissibly impose significant 
costs,19 the crux of an easy duty to rescue is that given minimal cost to the rescuer 
and significant benefit to the rescuee, there is an obligation to rescue. Few would 
deny the intuitive force of an easy duty to rescue. As a moral matter, it seems plainly 
wrong to continue about one’s business if muddy clothing, for instance, is the only
difference between saving a drowning child’s life or permitting him to perish.
Scholars in health law, business ethics, and bioethics have been inspired by the 
easy duty to rescue. They contemplate its application to for-profit entities in the 
                                                                                                            
18. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972).
19. See, e.g., id. Singer actually advocates for more than an easy duty to rescue. He puts 
forward two principles. The more robust principle involves not “sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance.” Id. The more limited principle involves not “sacrificing 
anything morally significant.” Id.; see also PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR 
ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996).
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context of access to and affordability of biopharmaceutical products.20 The bystander 
walking by the pond is replaced by a biopharmaceutical company with rights to or 
control over the mechanism of rescue. An ill patient (or patients) stands in for the 
drowning child. Rescue is contemplated as involving donating medications, reducing 
prices, or various tinkering with the management of a company’s intellectual 
property—for instance, by licensing the medication to generic firms or becoming less 
litigious over patent protections.21 The main idea is that if there are minimal cost
interventions that a biopharmaceutical company could deploy that would have 
significant benefits for patients in need, these companies are subject to a moral duty 
to rescue.
This Article refers to the application of a moral duty to rescue to for-profit 
companies as a “corporate duty to rescue” or “CDTR.”22 Proponents of these 
proposals suggest that a CDTR not only exists, but in the biopharmaceutical context 
could help to improve access to medications. Moreover, a CDTR maintains the 
current intellectual and regulatory property system while responding to great human 
need.23 This might be viewed as a feature and not necessarily a bug. Without 
sufficient intellectual property protection, the thought is that corporate profits will 
suffer and in turn innovation will be materially curtailed.24 It is a solution that seeks 
                                                                                                            
20. Thomas W. Dunfee, Do Firms with Unique Competencies for Rescuing Victims of 
Human Catastrophes Have Special Obligations? Corporate Responsibility and the AIDS 
Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 185 (2006); Anita Ho, Global Health 
Disparity and Pharmaceutical Companies’ Obligation to Assist, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN 
PHARMACEUTICS 29, 31 (Dien Ho ed., 2017) [hereinafter Ho, Global Health Disparity]; Anita 
Ho, Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Duty to Aid in HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 24 BUS. &
PROF. ETHICS J. 51 (2005) [hereinafter Ho, Pharmaceutical Corporations]; Nien-hê Hsieh, 
Corporate Moral Agency, Positive Duties, and Purpose, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
FIRMS 188, 190–92 (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (ebook) (discussing Dunfee’s 
proposal); Nien-hê Hsieh, Property Rights in Crisis: Managers and Rescue, in ETHICS AND 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 379 (Michael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Hseih, Property Rights in Crisis] (ebook); Florencia Luna, Responsibility—In 
Public Health, in GLOBAL ETHICS FOR LEADERSHIP: VALUES AND VIRTUES FOR LIFE 111, 125–
27 (Christoph Stückelberger, Walter Fust & Obiora Ike eds., 2016); Kevin Outterson & 
Donald W. Light, Global Pharmaceutical Markets, in A COMPANION TO BIOETHICS 417 (Helga 
Kuhse & Peter Singer eds., 2009) (putting forward a related argument that drug companies 
may have an ethical duty to permit rescue), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2
.cfm?abstract_id=1565536 [https://perma.cc/W74Z-4ZPX]; see also Paul G. Harris & Patricia 
Siplon, International Obligation and Human Health: Evolving Policy Responses to HIV/AIDS,
15 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 29, 44–45 (2001) (drawing on Singer’s work to make a related claim 
that developed countries have a duty to rescue).
21. One might wonder why rescue efforts are framed as focusing solely on access to 
existing medications and not further encompassing certain research agendas themselves. 
Conceivably, a duty to rescue could cover research efforts, but a significant challenge would 
be overcoming the minimal cost clause. See, e.g., Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20,
at 42 (discussing Ebola and noting the open question of “who may have the moral obligation 
to develop such treatment, since the principle of rescue does not require potential actors to 
make substantial sacrifice”).
22. Cf. sources cited supra note 15.
23. Hsieh, Property Rights in Crisis, supra note 20, at 381–82.
24. Id. at 380–81. Of course, the desirability of some system of intellectual and regulatory 
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to avoid messy, if not uncomfortable, inquiries into the underlying fairness of the 
background distribution of wealth and resources.
A duty to rescue is a general obligation, applicable to all moral agents.25 Yet, some 
proposals for a CDTR are framed as one of special obligation.26 Whereas the former 
would position biopharmaceutical companies as just one of all moral agents 
potentially under an obligation of rescue, the latter singles out biopharmaceutical 
companies as uniquely responsible for rescue.27 The idea that biopharmaceutical 
companies have obligations of rescue, and potentially special obligations at that, is 
not unique to the drug pricing and access context. CDTR arguments are implicated 
beyond the biopharmaceutical space more generally within the corporate social 
responsibility and business and human rights literatures.28
Before taking a closer look at CDTR proposals, it is worthwhile to be clear about 
two preliminary assumptions. The analysis in this Article assumes both that 
biopharmaceutical companies can be moral agents, and, further, that 
biopharmaceutical companies, at least sometimes, can have positive moral 
obligations. These assumptions are important because the transition from the 
paradigm rescue case to the corporate one involves a move from natural to juridical 
persons. This move inherently brings with it philosophical complexities that cannot 
be attended to here.29 Nevertheless, these assumptions for the sake of moving the 
analysis forward ought not to be unduly controversial.
A moral CDTR has intuitive appeal. Yet, as will be argued in Part IV, application 
of a duty to rescue to the biopharmaceutical context is far from straightforward, 
morally speaking. It is unclear what this moral duty requires of biopharmaceutical 
                                                                                                            
property does not prove the desirability of the version currently in place.
25. Tina Rulli & Joseph Millum, Rescuing the Duty to Rescue, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 260,
260 (2016).
26. Dunfee, supra note 20.
27. Georg Marckmann, Access to Essential Drugs: The Ethical Challenge of Allocating 
Obligations, in BIOETHICS IN A SMALL WORLD 111, 112 (Felix Thiele & R. E. Ashcroft eds., 
2005); Christian Barry & Kate Raworth, Access to Medicines and the Rhetoric of 
Responsibility, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 57, 58 (2002); David Miller, Distributing 
Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHILOS. 453, 453 (2001) (discussing special obligations). 
28. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 15, at 226–27 (focusing on obesity and climate change 
contexts and arguing that corporations have a moral duty to assist when they have superior or 
unique capabilities to assist and assistance comes with “relatively little effort”); Jackson, supra
note 15, at 550 (discussing a corporate duty to assist, though distinguishing as broader than a 
duty to rescue); Wood, supra note 15, at 82–83 (arguing in the human rights context that 
corporations are subject to a duty to rescue and using this framework as a basis of moral 
obligations where a special relationship exists between a corporation and the perpetrator, 
victim rights-holders, or interests at stake); Business Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
ARCHIVE (Nov. 17, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/ethics-business
[https://perma.cc/D4GA-H83C] (not using the label “rescue,” but observing that arguments 
for corporate social responsibility rely on the premise that “any agent with the resources and 
knowledge necessary to ameliorate these problems has a moral responsibility to do so, 
assuming the costs they incur on themselves are not great”).
29. Debates regarding the moral agency and obligations of firms are philosophically rich 
areas of interdisciplinary scholarship. For a recent anthology, including a variety of 
perspectives, see THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 20.
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companies, and the merits of this ethical approach, in some instances, may be 
contestable. Before getting to the critique of a CDTR provided in Part IV, the below 
introduces discussions of a CDTR in the literature.
B. Corporate Duty to Rescue Proposals and Access to Medications
Applying a moral CDTR to issues of drug pricing and access to medications has 
attracted the attention of scholars in several disciplines. Among others, business 
ethicists Nien-hê Hsieh and Thomas Dunfee have each put forward CDTR proposals. 
Health law scholar Kevin Outterson and bioethicist and health policy expert Donald 
Light have also explored the application of a CDTR to drug pricing issues.
Nien-hê Hsieh’s proposal draws upon the work of moral philosopher Thomas 
Scanlon. Following Scanlon, this proposal identifies three components of a rescue 
principle: The “plight is dire.”30 The would-be rescuer is both “in a position to 
alleviate the plight and has the means by which to do so at his or her disposal.”31
Finally, the duty is limited to cases in which the sacrifice is not “above some 
threshold.”32
Hsieh then applies this framework to the HIV/AIDS crisis in developing 
countries. He concludes that pharmaceutical companies are subject to a CDTR. 
“First, if the plight of those suffering from HIV/AIDS does not count as dire, then it 
is unclear what does. Second, pharmaceutical companies are well positioned to help 
alleviate the plight in ways that other parties are not.”33 According to Hsieh, 
pharmaceutical companies as patent holders can provide relief by forgoing the 
enforcement of their patents, reducing prices, or by donating essential medications.34
Finally, despite how large the problem of HIV/AIDS is in developing countries, he 
argues that the burden on companies may be small. HIV medications already exist, 
and, furthermore, pharmaceutical companies do not expect market price sales to poor 
people in developing countries.35 If parallel importation problems can be avoided, 
the amount of foregone profits—the real sacrifice under this scheme—arguably 
would be minimal.36 Therefore, Hsieh states that “pharmaceutical companies incur 
relatively little sacrifice by providing these medicines for free, or at manufacturing 
cost, to developing countries and by relaxing the enforcement of patent protection.”37
Since there is great need, pharmaceutical companies are in a position to help, and 
that help comes at minimal cost, pharmaceutical companies are under a CDTR.
Thomas Dunfee’s CDTR proposal also responds to the HIV/AIDS crisis. While 
the proposal discussed above appears motivated in part by the desire to provide aid 
without undermining patent protection, this proposal focuses on the fact that some 
                                                                                                            




34. Id. at 382–83.
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id. Roughly, parallel importation occurs when products intended for sale in one 
jurisdiction are imported to another jurisdiction to take advantage of pricing differences.
37. Id.
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firms possess a “unique human catastrophe rescue competency.”38 The combination 
of a unique competency and a corresponding catastrophe gives rise to a CDTR. 
Dunfee’s duty is “grounded in the simple claim that possession of a unique capacity 
to respond to a devastating catastrophe creates a mandatory obligation of rescue.”39
The duty is a limited one, arising only in extreme situations of “devastating, 
overwhelming . . . human need.”40
According to Dunfee, a company possesses a unique catastrophe rescue 
competency when it satisfies three conditions.41 First, its core competency must 
allow it to “mitigate or alleviate” either the cause or effect of the catastrophe.42
Second, the company needs to be able to provide mitigation or alleviation.43 Third, 
the firm must be unique in its abilities to address the catastrophe. 44 It must have a 
“comparative advantage.” 45 The company is not off the moral hook unless there is 
another entity better suited to the job.
Under this proposal, some pharmaceutical companies purportedly have unique 
catastrophe rescue competencies for addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis:
The catastrophe overlaps with their core competencies, particularly for 
those firms that produce or distribute the drugs commonly used in current 
treatment regimes. They hold patents on essential drugs. They have 
special knowledge concerning treatment regimes. They know about 
promising research leads for future treatment strategies. They either own 
manufacturing facilities or have special contractual relationships with 
suppliers. They have experience with transporting large quantities of 
drugs. They also have experience with educating medical staff in the use 
of the drugs. The uniqueness of their position is strengthened by the fact 
that they hold legal rights that may restrict others from providing relief 
without a license.46
In sum, according to Dunfee, some biopharmaceutical companies are uniquely 
positioned given their institutional knowledge, infrastructure, and intellectual 
property rights. This uniqueness is claimed to hold relative to other potential actors. 
“[B]ecause of their patent protection, productive resources and specialized 
knowledge, the case can be made that the global pharmaceuticals have comparative 
advantages over other possible providers, including other private sector providers, 
NGOs and government agencies.”47
Dunfee’s proposal for a CDTR does not explicitly condition rescue obligations 
upon their being undertaken at minimal cost. Rather, he ties the magnitude of the 
                                                                                                            
38. Dunfee, supra note 20, at 186.
39. Id. at 187 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. More specifically, Dunfee requires that the harm involve severe physical injury or 






46. Id. at 188–89.
47. Id. at 189.
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obligation to various ways of accounting for corporate resources spent on voluntary
social initiatives.48 For instance, if money spent on the previous year’s social 
initiatives is the largest of specified alternatives, this is the minimal amount that must 
be spent on rescue efforts.49 Presumably, however, the resources a biopharmaceutical 
company voluntarily spends on social initiatives comes at minimal cost to the 
company. Thus, in practice, Dunfee’s proposal may line up with the duty to rescue’s 
minimal cost clause. In theory, however, without more explicit indication, the two 
can come apart.
A third proposal is put forward by Outterson and Light. Whereas Hsieh and 
Dunfee’s proposals focus specifically on the accessibility of HIV/AIDS medications, 
Outterson and Light’s discussion focuses more generally on global access to 
important medications given high drug prices.50 They begin their analysis with the 
“important normative assumption . . . that if we can promote access without harming 
innovation, then we should do so. . . . [W]e have an ethical duty to rescue people who 
need essential medicines, especially when the rescue can be accomplished with 
minimal risk and cost.”51
Outterson and Light’s analysis emphasizes concern for costs to innovation. They 
argue that biopharmaceutical companies could allow different kinds of activities that 
would facilitate access to medications in less well-off countries without incurring 
significant—or potentially even any—costs to innovation incentives.52 This is so 
because the economic realities simply exclude some markets from sales to begin 
with, and the authors further claim that concerns over product arbitrage are 
overstated.53
Outterson and Light’s discussion takes many turns. Embedded within it is an 
argument resembling a “straightforward” CDTR. They argue, for instance, that 
“patent-based drug companies may be subject to an ethical duty to permit an easy 
rescue.”54 Discussing the potential for voluntary licensing agreements between brand 
and generic companies,55 a straightforward CDTR, for them, therefore might involve 
an obligation for branded biopharmaceutical companies to engage in transactions 
when those arrangements come at minimal cost to innovation.56 Ultimately, however, 
the authors are clear that their CDTR proposal is different. It is framed as being 
predicated on noninterference in harm. “Patent-based drug companies,” according to 
the authors, are not innocent bystanders.57
Outterson and Light’s analysis is informed by both moral and legal discussions of 
a duty to rescue. Observing that generally there is no legal duty to rescue, the authors 
note that an exception to this legal rule is interference in rescue: “[I]f the bystander 
was in some way responsible for the situation, or was impeding rescue by others, 
                                                                                                            
48. Id. at 190.
49. Id.
50. Outterson & Light, supra note 20, at 417.
51. Id. at 419.
52. Id. at 426.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 427.
55. Id. at 426; see also Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 32.
56. Outterson & Light, supra note 20, at 425–26.
57. Id. at 424.
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then a court might categorize the incident as misfeasance rather than nonfeasance, 
even absent any fault on the part of the bystander.”58 In other words, even though 
there is no legal liability for failing to rescue, there can be legal liability if one caused
the need to be rescued or interfered with the rescue efforts of third parties.
In the authors’ view, biopharmaceutical companies with patent protected products 
“actively work to prevent rescue by others.”59 Such companies do this by preventing 
generic entry during the patent period for products that would be directed to less 
well-off countries.60 The exercising of these rights “transforms the companies from 
innocent bystanders into entities claiming the legal right to prevent rescue.”61 The 
authors argue that this is morally problematic: biopharmaceutical companies should 
not be able to prevent other parties from engaging in rescue activities when those 
activities can occur at little or no cost to those companies. Thus, they “argue that 
global intellectual property law should be modified to permit rescue by others,
especially when the patent-based drug companies are not significantly disadvantaged 
thereby.”62 They go on to conclude:
As contributors to the creation of, and active participants in, global 
pharmaceutical markets, the patent-based drug companies may be 
subject to an ethical duty to permit an easy rescue, which in this case 
includes allowing opportunities to expand equitable access while 
preserving optimal innovation. At the very least, they should not actively 
hinder the rescue efforts of others and should permit generic licensing 
for those unable to pay wealthy country market prices.63
A reading of Outterson and Light’s discussion might conform to a CDTR 
proposal. To the extent, however, their proposal focuses on misfeasance and causal 
contribution to harm, their proposal is not strictly speaking a moral CDTR, 
invocation of “duty to rescue” language notwithstanding. Causal contribution 
arguments provide a different theoretical grounding for corporate obligations.
Outterson and Light’s discussion of interference with rescue is important.64 It 
provides a basis of critique of a moral CDTR. As will be argued in Part IV, some 
biopharmaceutical corporate activity is suggestive of culpability for harm caused by 
higher-than-they-probably-would-or-should-be-prices. For instance, as others have 
detailed, and the FDA has commented, biopharmaceutical companies utilize 
                                                                                                            
58. Id. at 420.
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 422. Note that whereas this Article frames a corporate duty to rescue as a 
potential form of self-regulation, Outterson and Light contemplate its use for external 
regulation.
63. Id. at 427.
64. There is also much to discuss, triggered by Outterson and Light, regarding existing 
legal tools that “permit rescue.” Such mechanisms might include the “march-in rights” 
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act under 35 U.S.C. § 203 and government patent use under 28 
U.S.C. § 1498. Furthermore, as their argument targets on-patent therapies, it overlooks that 
some generic companies also act in ways that appear to interfere with rescue.
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numerous tactics to suppress generic competition.65 Yet, an interference argument 
relies on distinct considerations of causal contribution, an issue bracketed until Part 
IV.66
II. DISCHARGING A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE: LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY AND 
LEGAL ABILITY
With the moral duty to rescue introduced and proposals for a moral CDTR in the 
biopharmaceutical space presented, practical considerations arise. The duty must be 
considered from a legal perspective.67 After all, interest in a moral CDTR for 
addressing drug pricing and access controversies loses steam if this mechanism is 
legally untenable.
Two legal issues must be addressed. First, is a CDTR legally enforceable as a 
tort? Second, do managers and directors of biopharmaceutical companies
—specifically biopharmaceutical corporations—have the legal ability to discharge a 
corporation’s CDTR? The second of these issues is more important. Even though a 
CDTR likely is not legally enforceable under existing tort law, it is also not 
proscribed. Lack of legal enforceability is, to be sure, a challenge. Yet, if managers 
and directors are not able within the bounds of current law to discharge a CDTR, 
proposals for such a duty are, practically speaking, a dead end.
Significant debate exists about the purpose of for-profit corporations and their 
legal ability to take nonshareholder interests into consideration. However, 
corporations do have the legal ability to discharge a CDTR. Moreover, 
biopharmaceutical corporations routinely engage in “rescue-like” activities.
                                                                                                            
65. See, e.g., Gregory H. Jones, Michael A. Carrier, Richard T. Silver & Hagop 
Kantarjian, Strategies that Delay or Prevent the Timely Availability of Affordable Generic 
Drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD 1398, 1399 (2016); Michael A. Carrier, High Prices & 
No Excuses: 6 Anticompetitive Games (Nov. 6, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3066514
[https://perma.cc/XZ8U-WQUV] (presentation slides for 2017 Federal Trade Commission 
workshop on “Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets”); Gottlieb, supra 
note 10; Reference Listed Drug (RLD) Access Inquiries, FDA, https://www
.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Appro
valApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ucm607738.htm [https://
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66. For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the commonsense morality assumption that 
there is a tenable moral difference between doing, or causing harm, and “merely” allowing 
harm. I do not adopt the more stringent position that moral agents only have moral duties with 
respect to harms they have caused. See generally Larry S. Temkin, Thinking About the Needy, 
Justice, and International Organizations, 8 J. ETHICS 349 (2004).
67. This Article observes an analytical distinction between a moral duty to rescue and 
cases involving (morally) wrongful causal contribution to harm. The law, however, appears to 
sometimes blur this line by borrowing language and features from each. Tort law, for instance, 
contemplates cases in which an individual might innocently causally contribute to a hazard, 
yet have a legal duty to aid in order to prevent further harm. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 322 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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A. A Corporate Duty to Rescue Tort Is Likely Not Legally Enforceable
As a tort, a CDTR faces severe legal impediment. A duty to rescue under existing 
law, at least in the United States, is generally legally unenforceable.68 Thus, a legally 
enforceable corporate duty to rescue appears to be a nonstarter.
The common law draws a sharp distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance; misfeasance roughly involves an individual wrongly making another 
worse off.69 Nonfeasance, by contrast, can be understood as a failure to prevent a 
harm for which one plays no part.70 The common law does not recognize legal 
liability for nonfeasance.71 Since paradigm moral duty to rescue cases involve 
instances of nonfeasance, there is no legal liability for failing to rescue. “Generations 
of law students have learned of the no-duty rule by reading hypothetical cases of 
babies who drowned in bathtubs and actual cases of people who drowned in ditches 
and lakes while bystanders did nothing.”72
Several states—Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island—do recognize a statutory 
duty to rescue.73 Vermont’s statute, for instance, covers situations of “expos[ure] to 
grave physical harm”74 and subject to some exclusions, a person must, “give 
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being 
                                                                                                            
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
37 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or 
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of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”); see also Outterson & Light, 
supra note 20, at 420. But, things are different in continental Europe. See, e.g., 1 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 127 (1984).
69. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908) (“There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law 
and more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active 
misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a failure to take positive 
steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the 
defendant.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (quoting Bohlen). 
70. Bohlen, supra note 69.
71. Id. at 221.
72. David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to 
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 655 (2006).
73. I do not include Wisconsin’s statute which applies to crime victims. WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.34 (West 2005). Further, a duty to rescue should not be confused with Good Samaritan 
Statutes. Good Samaritan statutory provisions offer an individual protection from liability, 
should she decide to become a rescuer. For previous surveys of duty to rescue and Good 
Samaritan statutes, see DECHERT FOR SAVELIFE FOUND., GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAWS THAT PROTECT FIRST RESPONDERS WHO ASSIST ACCIDENT 
VICTIMS (May 2014), http://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/7be34cce-ea0d-4c90-8b39
-53427acf4c43/file [https://perma.cc/YP85-SCHN]; Eugene Volokh, Duty to Rescue/Report 
Statutes, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 3, 2009, 12:24 AM), http://volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty
-to-rescuereport-statutes [https://perma.cc/626C-CZLW]. Duty to rescue statutes may further 
be distinguished from duty to report statutes which focus on crimes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 152.3 (West 2014).
74. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2017).
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provided by others.”75 Both Minnesota and Rhode Island’s statutes apply to 
situations in which the person is “at the scene of an emergency.”76 These statutes 
have never been applied to the biopharmaceutical context here contemplated.77
To the extent corporate entities are properly brought within the scope of these 
statutes78—and even if a plaintiff could clear all the hurdles—as a practical matter, 
they seem to be of limited utility. In Vermont, for instance, the only and maximum 
penalty is for willful violation and for $100.79 The statute does not mention an 
injunction. If that amount could be aggregated over a large patient population, it 
would not be nothing. Yet, given the amount of money at stake with high cost 
medications in the tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars per treatment, a 
favorable verdict would probably be little more than symbolic.
Given the above, utilizing a CDTR as a form of external regulation under current 
tort law appears unpromising.80 Litigating under a CDTR tort theory for addressing 
problems of biopharmaceutical pricing and access can be left aside.
B. Corporate Governance and Legal Ability to Discharge a Corporate 
Duty to Rescue
While a CDTR is unlikely to be enforceable under current tort law, discharging 
such a duty is legally permissible as an internal corporate strategy. An easy CDTR 
involves a corporation making a minimal cost sacrifice in order to benefit others. 
Corporate rescue in the biopharmaceutical context involves assisting patients with 
access to medications. An obvious way to think about “cost” in the corporate setting 
is in terms of forgone profits. For instance, instead of accruing $1,000,000 in profits 
without discharging a CDTR, suppose a company instead accrues $950,000 in profits 
with discharging a CDTR. Discharging a CDTR in this example, comes at a cost of 
$50,000. Whether 5% of a corporation’s profits counts as minimal is debatable 
(particularly if this spending were to become iterative), but it seems uncontroversial 
that the diversion of the $50,000 would be, barring additional facts, a cost.
                                                                                                            
75. Id.
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2010); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002).
77. Searches, last conducted on April 17, 2019, in Westlaw of cases citing VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 519 returned 25 results, citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 returned 10 results, citing 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 returned 3 results. None of these cases involved a 
biopharmaceutical company, and none had facts resembling those that would be at issue in a 
case regarding the unaffordability of medications.
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 subd. 2(c) (West 2010) (including “[f]or the 
purposes of this section” that “‘person’” can mean “any partnership, corporation, association, 
or other entity”) Clarification is needed whether “section” means section as opposed to 
subdivision. The distinction being whether this definition of person is only meant to apply to 
the Good Samaritan portion of the statute.
79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (2017); FEINBERG, supra note 68, at 127 (describing 
penalty as a slap on the wrist).
80. But see Paul J. Zwier, High Prices in the U.S. for Life-Saving Drugs: Collective 
Bargaining Through Tort Law?, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 203 (2016)
(exploring the role of courts, class actions, and claims for emotional distress to impose liability 
on pharmaceutical companies for drug pricing).
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Can corporate managers and directors sacrifice a corporation’s profits to 
discharge a CDTR within the bounds of the law?81 Though somewhat contested, this 
Article argues yes. Managers and directors are not required to maximize profits in 
all contexts. This Section argues for two main points. First, managers and directors 
have the legal discretion to discharge a corporation’s moral CDTR. Second, 
corporate decisions to discharge a CDTR likely will be accorded deference and 
protected under the business judgment rule. Further, though an easy CDTR, as a 
philosophical matter, can involve a minimal cost to the rescuer, it may be that some 
or even many instances of corporate rescue are costless or beneficial to a corporation. 
Engaging in costless or beneficial rescue is clearly within the legal powers of 
corporate management.
1. The Ability to Trade-off Profits in Order to Discharge a Corporate 
Duty to Rescue
Corporate management’s legal ability to discharge a CDTR intersects with larger 
conversations about the role of for-profit corporations in society. A CDTR is a 
specialized issue within this broader context.
The more general issue of corporate social responsibility has been debated since 
at least the early twentieth century with a famous exchange appearing in the Harvard 
Law Review. Reacting to problems generated by the separation of ownership 
(shareholders) and control (officers and directors) and the prospect of manager self-
enrichment, Professor Berle argued that corporations must be run exclusively for the 
benefit of shareholders.82 In response, Professor Dodd, though sensitive to Berle’s 
concerns, responded that a corporation is run not just for shareholder profit. A 
corporation, in Dodd’s assessment, is “an economic institution which has a social 
service as well as a profit-making function.”83 He therefore considered it 
“undesirable . . . to give increased emphasis . . . to the view that business corporations 
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders.”84
While recent scholarship offers several competing theories of corporate 
governance,85 “[t]oday, most corporate law scholars embrace some variant of 
shareholder primacy.”86 Under a shareholder primacy view, the end of corporate 
decision-making and the purpose of corporations themselves is the increase—and 
                                                                                                            
81. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733 (2005) (framing the general issue of corporate social responsibility in terms of profit 
sacrifice).
82. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931);
see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 971, 971–72 (1992).
83. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1148 (1932).
84. Id. at 1147–48.
85. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
86. Id. at 563; see also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 21–23 (2012);
Elhauge, supra note 81, at 736 (describing the “canonical view”).
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some believe maximization—of shareholder wealth.87 According to the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance (“Principles”),88 for instance, a 
for-profit corporation “should have as its objective the conduct of business activities 
with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”89 Some argue this 
is the only obligation of for-profit corporations, subject to obeying the law.90
Despite the dominance of shareholder primacy views in the academy and public 
rhetoric,91 an examination of law and principles reveals—as others have pointed 
out92—space for corporate management to incorporate considerations that may not 
maximize shareholder wealth. This can be true for operational business decisions as 
well as corporate charitable contributions. While promoting shareholder gain may be 
the primary obligation of for-profit corporations, arguably its pursuit may be 
permissibly limited.93
This position is reflected in the Principles, above noted. The Principles, while not 
law, are “considered a significant, if not controlling, source of doctrinal authority.”94
                                                                                                            
87. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Jonathan 
R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
177, 178 (2008); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function 
of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 939
(2017); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is 
usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles.”).
88. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (AM. LAW INST.
1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
89. Id. § 2.01.
90. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763 (2015); see also Milton
Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine–The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. Yet, Friedman also says more broadly: “That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with . . . mak[ing] as much money as 
possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and 
those embodied in ethical custom.” Id. at 33; see also STOUT, supra note 86, at 21 (noting the 
pervasiveness of this view).
91. STOUT, supra note 86, at 2–3.
92. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 81.
93. PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, at § 2.01 cmt. e (“The provisions of Subsection (b) reflect 
a recognition that the corporation is a social as well as an economic institution, and accordingly 
that its pursuit of the economic objective must be constrained by social imperatives and may 
be qualified by social needs.”).
94. Macey, supra note 87, at 178. § 2.01 is a “central Restatement rule[] of the 
Principles.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance,
48 BUS. LAW. 1271, 1275 (1993). But note PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, § 2.01 cmt. a (“Present 
law on the matters within the scope of § 2.01 cannot be stated with precision, because the case 
law is evolving and not entirely harmonious, while the statutes cover only some of the relevant 
issues and leave open significant questions even as to the issues they do cover. However, there 
is direct or indirect authoritative support for all of the principles embodied in § 2.01.”).
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After stating in section 2.01(a) that corporations should aim to enhance “corporate 
profit and shareholder gain,” section 2.01(b) lists three exceptions:
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, 
the corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) Is obliged, to the same 
extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) 
May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded 
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote 
a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, 
educational, and philanthropic purposes.95
Though section 2.01(b)(1) is stated as a requirement, (b)(2) and (b)(3) provide 
options. Corporations are neither required nor prohibited from taking ethical or 
philanthropic considerations into account, even if management does not determine 
that corporate profit is enhanced. The Principles therefore indicate that corporations 
have the discretion to attend to moral obligations “whether or not they enhance 
[economic] returns (that is, even if the conduct either yields no economic return or 
entails a net economic loss).”96 The commentary further notes, “Corporate officials 
are not less morally obliged than any other citizens to take ethical considerations into 
account, and it would be unwise social policy to preclude them from doing so.”97
A duty to rescue is considered to be a general moral obligation applicable to all 
moral agents. The commentary of the Principles supports the position that for-profit 
corporations not only are subject to a CDTR as moral agents, but that corporate 
governance law allows managers and directors to discharge a CDTR. Shareholder 
primacy does not necessarily preclude discharging a CDTR.
Though federal securities laws play a role, corporate governance law is generally 
a matter of state statutory and case law.98 The internal law of a corporation’s charter 
and bylaws can also provide guidance.99 Two cases, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.100 and 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,101 are often cited in debates about 
shareholder primacy and the objectives of for-profit corporations. As argued below, 
however, neither case appears to foreclose a corporation from discharging a CDTR.
Dodge v. Ford is a Michigan Supreme Court case.102 While Delaware is the most 
influential source of state corporate law in the United States,103 this case is 
nevertheless perhaps the one most cited by legal academics for the “core lesson that 
corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the corporation for the purpose 
                                                                                                            
95. PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, § 2.01(b) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 2.01 cmt. f.
97. Id. § 2.01 cmt. h.
98. STOUT, supra note 86, at 27–29; see also Heminway, supra note 87, at 941.
99. STOUT, supra note 86, at 27–28; Heminway, supra note 87, at 941 & n.4.
100. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
101. 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). I leave aside other Delaware cases frequently cited 
regarding shareholder primacy given that they arise in the context of takeovers or company 
sales, though the court in eBay applies heightened scrutiny to some of the Board’s actions.  
102. Dodge, 170 N.W. 668.
103. Delaware is widely viewed as the most important jurisdiction for corporate law. See 
Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166-
67 (2008).
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of maximizing profits for the benefit of shareholders.”104 At issue was the Ford Motor 
Company’s decision not to issue additional special dividends to shareholders. 
Instead, the money would be used “to employ still more men; to spread the benefits 
of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes.”105 Interpreting this as running a for-profit corporation for the 
primary purpose of promoting the greater good and only of incidental benefit to 
shareholders, the court found this impermissible.106 The court ordered Ford to issue 
a dividend, though left its business plans intact.107
Though Dodge v. Ford puts forward a shareholder primacy view of corporate 
governance,108 it does not take the stronger position of shareholder wealth 
maximization as the only end of corporate decision-making.109 Its position is not 
inconsistent with corporate directors discharging a CDTR. Despite “some strong pro-
shareholder profits language . . . the opinion never stated that directors’ exclusive 
duty is to maximize shareholder profits. Rather, it states that profits should be the 
primary but not exclusive goal of managers.”110 The court leaves unquestioned that 
for-profit corporations can “engage in humanitarian works.”111 It draws a distinction 
between incidental expenditures “and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind 
at the expense of others.”112 Thus, “an incidental humanitarian expenditure of 
corporate funds” is permissible given it is not the company’s main business.113 An 
easy CDTR with its feature of minimal cost, presumably fits within this rubric. A 
compelling reading of Dodge v. Ford is not one that obligates directors to exclusively 
profit maximize for the benefit of shareholders, but one that “limits the degree of 
profit-sacrificing discretion.”114
A more recent case cited for articulating a shareholder primacy view is the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.115 In brief, 
eBay was a minority shareholder of the popular classified ads website craigslist.116
The court described craigslist and eBay as being “a study in contrasts, with different 
business strategies, different cultures, and different perspectives on what it means to 
run a successful business.”117 Whereas craigslist “largely operate[d] its business as a 
                                                                                                            
104. Macey, supra note 87, at 178.
105. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
106. Id. at 684; see also id. at 683–84.
107. Id. at 685.
108. “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.” Id. at 684.
109. See generally Stout, supra note 103 (expressing skepticism of the case’s authority and 
prevailing interpretation).
110. Elhauge, supra note 81, at 772–73; see also STOUT, supra note 86; Heminway, supra
note 87, at 951.
111. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Elhauge, supra note 81, at 773.
115. 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
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community service” without a focus on monetization,118 eBay “operate[d] its 
business with an eye to maximizing revenues, profits, and market share.”119
After eBay launched a competitor website, craigslist’s two other board members 
sought mechanisms to diminish eBay’s control as well as access to confidential 
information.120 In analyzing the propriety of one of the board’s actions, the court 
expounded on the purpose of for-profit corporations:
The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an 
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there 
are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.
. . . [T]he craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and 
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.121
Though the language in this opinion supports a shareholder primacy view,122 like 
Dodge v. Ford, it leaves space for other ends. Promoting “the value of the corporation 
for the benefit of its stockholders” is broad language that does not necessarily call 
for profit maximization. A plausible interpretation of this case is that a for-profit 
corporation must ensure that other considerations are not too dominant. Clearly 
craigslist did not, in the court’s opinion, strike the right balance. This is so despite 
craigslist not being “purely philanthropic” as it did engage in limited fee charging.123
Circling back to sections 2.01(b)(2) and (3) of the Principles, Dodge and eBay
might be read as situations in which ethical or other-regarding concerns were 
unreasonably pursued. The issue is not that such concerns were pursued in the first 
instance. It is plausible to think that a CDTR could be reasonably pursued, given that 
the “easy” form of the duty discussed here is only triggered if rescue occurs at 
minimal cost. Moreover, as discussed below, it is a real possibility that 
biopharmaceutical corporations may be able to engage in “rescue” efforts that are 
either costless or beneficial to those corporations.124
Before turning to the business judgment rule and the parameters of director 
discretion, two sources of state statutory law are of pertinence. These are 
constituency statutes and statutes governing corporate charitable contributions. 
Though this statutory authority is of relevance, it has argumentative limitations. 
Delaware—the jurisdiction where many significant biopharmaceutical corporations 
are incorporated—lacks a constituency statute. And, while Delaware does permit 
corporate charitable contributions, morally speaking, framing a CDTR as charity is 
inaccurate. Nevertheless, constituency statutes could be useful where applicable to 
                                                                                                            
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Heminway, supra note 87, at 960; Strine, supra note 90, at 776–77. The Rights Plan 
at issue in eBay was subjected to the enhanced level of scrutiny described under Unocal and 
was not evaluated under the business judgment rule. eBay, 16 A.3d at 28–35.
123. eBay, 16 A.3d at 8.
124. See infra Section II.B.2.
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firms incorporated in non-Delaware jurisdictions, and corporate charitable 
contribution statutes could provide legal cover for discharging a CDTR.
Constituency statutes vest directors with the authority to consider and “serve the 
interests not only of shareholders but of other constituencies as well, such as 
employees, customers, creditors, and the local community.”125 Though their interests 
may align, discharging a CDTR involves consideration of groups beyond a 
corporation’s shareholders. In particular, it involves consideration of the 
corporation’s customers or potential customers who are priced out. A majority of 
states, though again significantly not Delaware, have adopted constituency 
statutes.126
Though numerous biopharmaceutical companies are incorporated in Delaware, 
several of the largest companies are not.127 For instance, Johnson & Johnson128 and 
Merck & Co.129 are incorporated in New Jersey. New Jersey’s constituency statute 
permits consideration of an action’s impact on nonshareholders including customers 
as well as the community.130 Likewise, Indiana, where Eli Lilly and Company is 
incorporated,131 has an even broader statute. When “considering the best interests of 
a corporation,” the statute allows a director to consider the “customers of the 
corporation” and “any other factors the director considers pertinent.”132 Under 
Indiana law, directors further may weigh the interests of various groups “as the 
directors deem appropriate.”133
Relying on constituency statutes has at least two limitations.134 First, under the 
internal affairs doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation applies to actions 
                                                                                                            
125. STOUT, supra note 86, at 28; see also Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 973–74.
126. STOUT, supra note 86, at 28; Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto 
& Anne M. Tucker, Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 73 app. A (2015) (observing that thirty-three states have constituency statutes,
but that seventeen states, including Delaware and California, do not). These statutes, however, 
vary when they apply.
127. Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., and Eli Lilly and Company are among the twenty-
five largest biopharmaceutical companies by both market cap and revenue as reported in 
Bloomberg. Data from Bloomberg Terminal (accessed Feb. 5, 2018) (on file with author).
128. Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2019) (indicating New 
Jersey as place of incorporation), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406
/000020040619000009/form10-k20181230.htm [https://perma.cc/PC7E-QWLH].
129. Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2019) (indicating New 
Jersey as place of incorporation), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310158
/000031015819000014/mrk1231201810k.htm [https://perma.cc/HH8S-L6P5].
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003).
131. Eli Lilly and Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2019) (indicating 
Indiana as place of incorporation), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478
/000005947819000082/lly-20181231x10xk.htm [https://perma.cc/SE49-RK5W].
132. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (West 2011).
133. Id. § 23-1-35-1(g).
134. An additional limitation is that some constituency statutes are limited to certain 
contexts such as takeovers. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2017).
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against officers and directors.135 Relying on the existence of a constituency statute to 
argue that directors have the legal ability to sacrifice profits in the service of 
discharging a CDTR may be therefore jurisdictionally dependent. Several of the 
recent high-profile drug pricing and access controversies involve companies that are 
not incorporated in states with constituency statutes. Gilead Sciences, Inc., the 
manufacturer of important hepatitis C medications, for instance, is incorporated in 
Delaware (and has executive offices in California).136 Neither Delaware nor 
California has a constituency statute.137 Likewise, Biogen Inc., the maker of 
Spinraza, controversially expensive at $750,000 per year,138 is incorporated in 
Delaware.139 Furthermore, many biopharmaceutical companies are incorporated in 
foreign jurisdictions. Turing Pharmaceuticals AG, which caused the public uproar 
over its pricing of Daraprim, was incorporated in Switzerland.140 Incorporation in a 
foreign jurisdiction is not necessarily detrimental to the argument of legal 
permissibility. It may be that the law of foreign jurisdictions is favorable,141 though 
an inquiry into foreign law will need to be reserved for another day.
The second limitation pertains to constituency statutes themselves. Constituency 
statutes are critiqued on at least two primary grounds. First, there is a lack of clarity 
about key provisions.142 Important questions include the weight nonshareholder 
interests may be given and the categories of nonshareholder interests that may be 
considered.143 The second critique is that constituency statutes are an ineffective tool 
for advancing nonshareholder interests. Chief Justice Strine of the Supreme Court of 
Delaware does not mince words: “declaring that directors may consider other 
interests without giving those interests voting or enforcement rights, or any real 
leverage to influence decision-making, is more an exercise in feeling good than in 
                                                                                                            
135. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987) (“The internal affairs 
doctrine requires that the law of the state of incorporation should determine issues relating to 
internal corporate affairs.”).
136. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 7, 2017) (indicating 
Delaware as place of incorporation and California as address of principal executive offices), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882095/000088209517000027/q317form10-q.htm
[https://perma.cc/WWH5-6H3Q].
137. Geczy et al., supra note 126, at app. A. 
138. Julie Appleby, Drug Puts a $750,000 ‘Price Tag on Life,’ NPR (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:05 
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/08/01/540100976/drug-puts-a-750
-000-price-tag-on-life [https://perma.cc/CP5M-6XKM].
139. Biogen Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 21, 2017) (noting Delaware as place 
of incorporation), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/875045/000119312517348663
/d281870d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/ZG9H-TLJZ].
140. Turing Pharmaceuticals AG, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D/A)
(Aug. 19, 2015) (noting Switzerland as place of incorporation), https://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/1650139/000165013915000002/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma
.cc/LK3P-6HU7].
141. Novo Nordisk Inc., a Danish company, for instance, commits to a triple bottom line 
in its bylaws. Triple Bottom Line, NOVO NORDISK, http://www.novonordisk
-us.com/whoweare/about-novo-nordisk/triple-bottom-line.html [https://perma.cc/MX2K
-TAUR].
142. Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 988.
143. Id.
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doing good.”144 While these critiques are important, the existence of constituency 
statutes, warts and all, generally supports the argument that where such statutes are 
applicable and sufficiently broad, biopharmaceutical corporations may engage in 
corporate rescue.
While constituency statutes are a relatively recent development,145 corporate 
charitable contribution statutes are an older and important source of state statutory 
law. Almost all states, including Delaware, have these provisions,146 though there is 
diversity in how they relate to shareholder or corporate benefit.147 As two examples, 
Delaware includes the power to make donations among a corporation’s enumerated 
powers.148 It is silent as to the relationship with profit sacrifice. California, by 
contrast, explicitly states that corporations have such powers even if there is no 
corporate benefit. Under California law, a corporation has the power to “[m]ake 
donations, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for 
community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic, or similar 
purposes.”149 Several cases have upheld the ability to make charitable 
contributions.150
As previewed above, from a philosophical perspective, discussing a CDTR under 
the umbrella of corporate philanthropy muddies the analytical water. Doing so, 
however, is motivated by the legal inquiry.
A duty to rescue is generally regarded as a positive, perfect moral duty.151 It is 
nonoptional and applies in every instance of rescue where the underlying criteria are 
met. One acts wrongly if one is subject to a duty to rescue but fails to so act. Acts of 
philanthropy, by contrast, while good or even great, are generally not viewed as 
morally required. They are supererogatory.152
Furthermore, even if corporations are subject to a positive moral duty of charity, 
or beneficence, the duty is imperfect. A duty of charity, or beneficence is a duty 
“owed to someone or other, but to no one in particular. You are immoral, according 
to this view, if you never help anyone, but who you help and when is up to you.”153
Obligations of rescue seem different. One might legitimately respond to a request for 
money to save the whales with, “I donated last week.” When someone is drowning, 
however, saying “I just saved someone last week—sorry, find someone else” appears 
morally inadequate.154
                                                                                                            
144. Strine, supra note 90, at 768.
145. Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 973.
146. PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, § 2.01 reporter’s n. 4.
147. See Elhauge, supra note 81, at 767–68.
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153. Smith, supra note 151, at 21.
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Discussion of the legal ability of corporations to engage in charitable activities is 
not meant to blur this philosophical distinction. Rather, the discussion is pertinent 
because the legal mechanism for permitting corporate charity may provide additional 
legal authority for discharging a moral CDTR.
2. Business Judgment Rule Protection for Discharging a Corporate Duty to Rescue
In addition to the foregoing, there is further the practical reality of judicial review 
of corporate decision-making. Discharging a CDTR falls under an operational, as 
opposed to a structural (e.g., takeover, sale of company, etc.), business decision.155
Operational business decisions “generally receive much less probing review” by 
courts.156 As a practical matter, as this Section argues, discharging a CDTR 
(depending upon the specifics) likely would be protected under the business 
judgment rule. Furthermore, the breadth of discretion provided by the business 
judgment rule scuttles, from a legal perspective, the need for a searching analysis of 
what counts as a “minimal cost.”
The business judgment rule is a standard of judicial review employed when a 
plaintiff questions a board’s decision as a breach of fiduciary duty.157 The business 
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”158 It is not an evaluative 
standard for determining the lawful ends of for-profit corporations.159
The business judgment rule is extremely deferential.160 Rationality, and not 
reasonableness, is the metric. “A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound 
business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute 
its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.”161 The business 
judgment rule is difficult for a challenger to overcome. The plaintiff has the burden 
of showing that a majority of directors approving a challenged action were not 
disinterested, not fully informed in their approval, or did not act in good faith.162
As others note, Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark are anomalous for the 
directors’ motivational transparency.163 Take the case involving Mr. Ford. It would 
have been fairly easy for him to have won.164 Rather than expressing a motivation to 
                                                                                                            
155. Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 974.
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164. Macey, supra note 87, at 182.
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promote the greater good, he could have made a business case for the various changes 
he sought to implement.165 The court would not have questioned those decisions.166
“In other words, what mattered in this case was not what Mr. Ford did, but what he 
said he was doing.”167 This raises interesting questions about good lawyering and 
professional ethics.168 For our purposes, it demonstrates a fairly low bar for 
biopharmaceutical corporations wishing to discharge a CDTR. It is plausible to think 
that every proposed mechanism of rescue bears a rational relationship to a business 
purpose.
Engaging in corporate rescue, at a minimum, has the potential to foster good will 
(e.g., reputational enhancement, brand value, customer loyalty, etc.), if not in some 
instances, forestall regulation or provide additional profits or tax deductions. 
Discharging an easy CDTR involves (at most) minimal financial cost. Yet, there is 
the further possibility of costless or even profitable “rescue.”169
In some cases, discharging a CDTR might come at no cost to a corporation or 
even be of benefit. As the Principles observe: “An orientation toward lawful, ethical, 
and public-spirited activity will normally [foster long-run profit]. The modern 
corporation by its nature creates interdependencies with a variety of groups . . . . The 
long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on meeting the fair 
expectations of such groups.”170
Costless or beneficial rescue in the biopharmaceutical context could occur in 
several ways. For example, if a corporation can successfully price discriminate, avoid 
arbitrage, and on average sell its products at a price above the marginal cost of 
production, engaging in “rescue” might increase a corporation’s profits. Likewise, if 
a corporation negotiates a licensing agreement for a commercially irrelevant 
jurisdiction, this might also be costless. The salaries of in-house counsel negotiators 
are already accounted for, and a royalty could neutralize any costs of the negotiation 
and technology transfer.
Other potential costless rescue possibilities include current costs that are 
outweighed by long-term or later anticipated benefits. Discharging a CDTR might 
be costless or even profit enhancing over the long term through things like good will 
or forestalling external regulation that cuts into profits more severely.171 AbbVie’s 
commitment, for instance, “to limit[] price increases to below 10% no more than 
once a year” may have been motivated by the desire to forestall external regulation.172
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals also recently promised to limit price hikes.173 Calling price 
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increases “an indefensible act,” Alnylam’s CEO said price increases for their new 
rare disease drug will be in step with the Consumer Price Index.174 Their drug, 
however, has a six-figure price tag.175
It seems uncontroversial that when biopharmaceutical corporations can help 
patients at a profit or at no cost to themselves, they ought to.176 As Einer Elhauge has 
written more generally of companies engaging in profit maximizing socially 
responsible behavior, “such profitable activities raise no real issue of legal or 
normative interest. Of course, corporate managers can and should do good when it 
maximizes profits: What could be the argument to the contrary?”177
Whether discharging a CDTR in the biopharmaceutical access to medicines 
context is costless or profit enhancing is unclear. Deciphering as much would require 
an empirical analysis.178 It is conceivable, however, that engaging in rescue is aligned 
with enhancing a company’s bottom line. Some, for instance, have noted a business 
case for differential pricing as a means for providing greater exposure to emerging 
markets.179 Other corporate activities to be discussed below such as in-kind donations
and patient assistance programs that (controversially) look like rescue have been 
heavily critiqued as profit-enhancing tools. Regardless, there should be little to 
debate—legally or morally—about costless and profitable “rescue.” If 
biopharmaceutical corporations have opportunities to do good at no cost or even 
benefit to themselves, they ought to do so.
It is also conceivable that some instances of discharging a CDTR will involve 
profit sacrifice. Skepticism that socially responsible conduct aligns with profit 
maximization may be warranted since “[a]gitating for corporations to engage in 
responsible conduct that increases their profits is a lot like saying there are twenty-
dollar bills lying on the sidewalk that they have missed.”180 Companies generally 
have adequate profit-maximizing incentives not to leave free cash lying on the 
sidewalk. Such arguments, therefore, may be more about “creat[ing] a patina of 
conceivable profitability that makes it easier for managers to engage in conduct that 
really sacrifices expected corporate profits.”181
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[https://perma.cc/MX5E-FMTA] [hereinafter ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016].
180. Elhauge, supra note 81, at 744–45.
181. Id. at 745.
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In light of the immense amount of discretion courts give to operational decisions, 
it is unsurprising that there are no hard and fast rules to pin down what counts as 
rescue at minimal cost.182 Yet, at least one court reflecting on the permissible amount 
of corporate philanthropy employed a reasonableness standard tied to the federal tax 
code.183 This is so despite the fact that evaluation of charitable contributions fall 
under the business judgment rule.184 The court ruled that so long as philanthropic 
spending falls within the tax-deductible amount, such spending is reasonable and 
therefore permissible.185 Generally, corporations may deduct charitable contributions 
valued at up to “10 percent of the taxpayer’s taxable income.”186 Special rules 
allowing enhanced deductions also apply to contributions of inventory “used by the 
donee solely for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants”—clearly a pertinent 
provision for biopharmaceutical corporations.187
The Principles’ discussion may shed some light here. The Principles 
acknowledge that a business case exists in many instances for corporate philanthropy 
and resources devoted to public welfare. Yet, there might also be situations where 
such activities are “justified solely by social considerations.”188 When justified solely
by social considerations, such activities “should be subject to a limit of 
reasonableness.”189 This is because “the relevant considerations do not necessarily 
bear on the manner in which business should be conducted, and (partly for those 
reasons) there is no limit inherent in the considerations themselves on the extent to 
which corporate resources may be devoted to such purposes.”190 The Principles go 
on to suggest circumstances that might feed into a reasonableness determination. 
Proposed important factors to consider “are the customary level at which resources 
are devoted to such purposes among comparable corporations in proportion to 
earnings and assets, and the strength of the nexus between the use of corporate 
resources and the corporation’s business.”191
In the absence of a rational business purpose, one could attempt to cobble together 
a standard for determining a legally permissible “minimal cost” expenditure for 
discharging a CDTR. For legal purposes, the minimal cost requirement morphs into 
                                                                                                            
182. Cf. id. at 842–43. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, at § 2.01 illus. 5 & 6
(discussing variations of an insurance company relaxing loan standards and sacrificing profits 
to finance inner city projects).
183. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
184. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not 
question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through 
making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more 
general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder 
value.”).
185. Theodora Holding, 257 A.2d at 405.
186. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2012).
187. 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(3)(A)(i) (2012); see also Roger Colinvaux, Charitable 
Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 315 
(2013). 
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a suggested one of reasonableness. Reasonableness might be determined in 
accordance with how much a corporation may deduct from its taxes, how much 
comparable corporations are spending, and the relationship between the expenditure 
and the corporation’s business. Prima facie, from a moral perspective, however, none 
of these proposals are compelling.192 Further, and interestingly, replacing a minimal 
cost requirement with a reasonableness standard could serve to broaden the legally 
permissible burden imposed by a CDTR. While an easy CDTR as a moral matter 
only requires rescue at minimal cost, the law might actually tolerate rescue at 
reasonable cost.
***
In sum, the business judgment rule provides broad director discretion. This 
discretion covers decisions that may not maximize profits, and certainly covers 
decisions where rescue would be costless or beneficial. The business judgment rule 
thus likely protects biopharmaceutical corporations discharging a CDTR.
III. DO PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ALREADY ENGAGE IN RESCUE?
Biopharmaceutical corporations have the legal ability to discharge a CDTR. 
Further, they actually engage in the activities proponents of a CDTR have proposed. 
These activities include the forbearance of patent rights and issuance of non-assertion 
declarations, voluntary licenses, donations of medical products, price reductions and 
differential pricing, as well as patient assistance programs.193 The below briefly 
describes each of these mechanisms and provides examples for illustration. 
Beyond providing additional “real-world” evidence in support of the arguments 
made in Section II.B, this discussion brings two related issues to the fore. First, 
though certain activities are identified as a means for discharging obligations of 
corporate rescue, one might wonder whether, in any particular instance, this is an 
accurate characterization. Biopharmaceutical companies may not act out of a sense 
of moral obligation to rescue, so much as good business sense or even optional 
charity. Second, and more importantly, consideration of these candidate mechanisms 
necessitates further moral analysis. Though proposals for a CDTR claim that rescue 
involves certain activities, and an examination of law and principles demonstrates 
that biopharmaceutical corporations may sacrifice profits in order to rescue, neither 
provides an analysis of what discharging a moral CDTR requires. This issue, 
addressed in Part IV, is far more complicated than might seem at first glance. As will 
be argued in Part IV, a duty to rescue does not apply to the biopharmaceutical context 
in a straightforward way.
                                                                                                            
192. See Elhauge, supra note 81, at 842–43. As noted below, this critique also applies to 
Dunfee’s attempt to operationalize a CDTR.
193. Companies also engage in other access to medicine strategies such as efforts to 
“improve service delivery” as well as efforts to “improve population health indirectly.” Peter 
C. Rockers, Veronika J. Wirtz, Chukwuemeka A. Umeh, Preethi M. Swamy & Richard O. 
Laing, Industry-Led Access-to-Medicines Initiatives in Low- and Middle-Income Countries:
Strategies and Evidence, 36 HEALTH AFF. 706, 707 (2017).
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A. Forbearance of Patent Rights and Non-assertion Declarations
Patents and regulatory exclusivities create legal barriers for others entering a 
market. Patent holders, for instance, may exclude others from making, using, selling 
or otherwise practicing a patented invention for a set period of time.194 In the United 
States, patents typically have a term of twenty years,195 though pharmaceutical patent 
terms may be extended due to regulatory review.196 Biopharmaceutical companies 
can also receive various regulatory exclusivities—for instance, they can be given the 
ability to exclude others from using their data or marketing a similar product.197
Rights of exclusion (patent and regulatory) are justified on the basis of innovation 
incentives.198 Without the prospect of sufficient reward, it is argued that innovation 
will lag, new products will not come to market, and patients will suffer.199 The merits 
of the current patent and regulatory exclusivity regime may be debated. It is largely 
uncontroversial, however, that these rights impede access to presently existing 
therapies. Indeed, an exclusive right does so by design.
One set of strategies, therefore, for increasing access to existing therapies subject 
to legal exclusivities is to forgo either the legal rights themselves or their 
enforcement. Several CDTR proposals call upon biopharmaceutical companies to 
relax their rights.200 Many companies do. Of the twenty companies profiled in the
Access to Medicine Index (AMI), for example, fifteen companies now have publicly 
                                                                                                            
194. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
195. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
196. Id. § 156 (2012).
197. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012); see, e.g., Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The 
New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 83 (2016); Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities 
in Biological Pharmaceuticals––Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 419 (2012); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56
JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2016).
198. See, e.g., MERCK & CO., INC., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2016), https://www.merck
.com/about/views-and-positions/FINAL%20Public%20Policy%20Statement%20-%20
Access%20to%20Medicines%20April%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWX3-44VV]; PFIZER 
INC., GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2015), https://www.pfizer.com/files/about
/Position-Global-Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/48EU-3HYM]; Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 345 (2007); Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and 
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 
193, 194 (2005) (noting the view that “the research and development (R&D) enterprise must 
be nurtured by high prices to yield the next generation of breakthrough therapies”).
199. See, e.g., Intellectual Property, PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/advocacy/intellectual
-property [https://perma.cc/8TJM-RXW5].
200. Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 33; Ho, Pharmaceutical Corporations,
supra note 20, at 74; Hsieh, Property Rights in Crisis, supra note 20, at 382–83; see also Ho, 
Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 29 (noting some believe pharmaceutical companies
have a moral obligation to assist which includes “waiver of patent rights”).
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available patent filing and enforcement policies—up from thirteen companies in 
2016.201 The policies vary both in terms of covered jurisdictions and products.202
Some companies choose to forgo patent protection entirely—in certain markets. 
Of those thirteen companies with publicly available policies discussed in the 2016 
AMI, the majority have nonfiling policies that apply either to least developed 
countries, low income countries, or both.203 Merck & Co., for instance, has “a long 
standing general policy of not filing for patents for our products in low income 
countries.”204 Likewise, neither Roche,205 Novartis,206 nor GlaxoSmithKline “file for 
patent protection in Least Developed and Low Income Countries.”207 Roche further 
does not file patents “for any antiretroviral HIV medicines in sub-Saharan African 
countries.”208 Two of the profiled companies have policies that apply to middle-
income countries.209
Typically involving a patent, non-assertion declarations are pledges not to enforce 
the legal rights one possesses.210 Such declarations are often tailored to apply to 
specified products, in specified circumstances, and for specified jurisdictions.211
Non-assertion declarations allow space for others to enter the market. They allow 
“third parties to make, use, sell or import the patented article within the scope of the 
declaration, including in resource-limited settings, without fear of an infringement 
suit.”212
                                                                                                            
201. ACCESS TO MED. FOUND., ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2018, at 96 (2018),
https://accesstomedicinefoundation.org/media/uploads/downloads/5c1a82b34aa87_Access
-to-Medicine-Index-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XJ5-X2Q3] [hereinafter ACCESS TO 
MEDICINE INDEX 2018]. Thirteen companies with such policies were noted in the 2016 ACCESS 
TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016, supra note 179, at 39.
202. ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016, supra note 179, at 39.
203. Id.
204. MERCK & CO., INC., supra note 198, at 3; see also Asher Mullard, What New GSK 
Patent Policy Means for the Developing World, NATURE (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nature
.com/news/what-new-gsk-patent-policy-means-for-the-developing-world-1.19695 [https://
perma.cc/86ZW-R9NG].
205. ROCHE, IMPROVING ACCESS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS 9 (2013), https://www.roche
.com/dam/jcr:a9c0006a-fed9-4864-a8c9-d8ffec6ca508/en/access_to_healthcare.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B4HT-5GY6].
206. Expanding Access to Healthcare, NOVARTIS, https://www.novartis.com/our
-company/corporate-responsibility/expanding-access-healthcare [https://perma.cc/UU3D
-4LCF].
207. GSK Expands Graduated Approach to Patents and Intellectual Property to Widen 
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As with decisions to forgo patent rights, non-assertion declarations tend to apply 
to jurisdictions of less commercial significance. Indeed, many of the covered 
countries can choose not to enforce patents as the World Trade Organization granted 
an extension to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) “from needing to recognise
patent rights on pharmaceuticals until 2033.”213 Several biopharmaceutical 
companies have non-assertion declarations and agreements.214 For example, Janssen 
has a policy, expanded in 2015, not to enforce its patents on the antiretroviral drug 
darunavir “for pediatric products used in low- and middle- income countries.”215
B. Voluntary Licenses
Another candidate corporate rescue mechanism is voluntary licensing.216 “A 
voluntary license is an authorization given by the patent holder to a third party (e.g., 
a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer), allowing that party to make, use, sell or 
import the patented article, e.g., a medicine.”217 Licensing terms vary and can be 
designed in various ways,218 including quality requirements as well as jurisdictional 
restrictions.219 Voluntary licenses can be exclusive or non-exclusive.220 The AMI 
recommends that “[t]o have a significant impact on access, licences should be non-
exclusive, transparent and include access-friendly terms.”221
Whereas biopharmaceutical companies are generally opposed to compulsory 
licensing, they are more receptive to voluntary licensing as a means for increasing 
access to their products. A recent study of initiatives across twenty-one companies 
found that twenty-two percent of access to medicines initiatives involved licensing 
agreements.222 Two recent examples of licensing arrangements are licenses 
facilitated by the Medicines Patent Pool, which focuses on HIV, hepatitis C, and 
                                                                                                            
213. ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016, supra note 179, at 39.
214. Id.; see also IFPMA, supra note 210, at 3 (providing selected examples of ARV 
initiatives using voluntary licenses or non-assert declarations); Quentin A. Palfrey, Expanding 
Access to Medicines and Promoting Innovation: A Practical Approach, 24 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 161, 191–92 (2017).
215. Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Expands IP Policy to Create 
Broad Access in 128 Countries for Development of New and Optimized HIV Medicine 
Formulations for Children Living with HIV (May 11, 2015), https://www.jnj.com/media
-center/press-releases/johnson-johnson-expands-ip-policy-to-create-broad-access-in-128
-countries-for-development-of-new-and-optimized-hiv-medicine-formulations-for-children
-living-with-hiv [https://perma.cc/5RWT-LSL7]; see also ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016,
supra note 179, at 86.
216. Outterson & Light, supra note 20, at 426–27; see also Ho, Global Health Disparity,
supra note 20, at 35.
217. IFPMA, supra note 210, at 2.
218. Palfrey, supra note 214, at 185–91.
219. IFPMA, supra note 210, at 2.
220. Palfrey, supra note 214, at 190.
221. ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2016, supra note 179, at 38.
222. Rockers et al., supra note 193, at 708. The study focused on low- and middle-income 
countries, excluding high-income countries.
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tuberculosis,223 and Gilead’s licensing of its hepatitis C medications.224 Gilead’s 
licensing policies have been controversial. Among other criticisms, advocacy groups 
have criticized the exclusion of several middle-income countries where large 
segments of the population are poor and suffer from hepatitis C.225 In response to 
external pressure, Gilead expanded its licensing agreement in August 2017 to include 
Ukraine, Belarus, Thailand, and Malaysia.226
C. Donations of Medical Products
In addition to alterations to intellectual property management strategies, several 
of the CDTR proposals contemplate the provision of in-kind donations.227 Donations 
of medicines is a common, though fraught,228 practice among biopharmaceutical 
companies.229
                                                                                                            
223. The Medicines Patent Pool, UNITAID, https://unitaid.eu/project/medicines-patent-
pool/#en [https://perma.cc/FK6M-UJRZ]. The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) works with a 
number of pharmaceutical companies including ViiV Healthcare, Bristol-Myers Squib, 
Gilead, AbbVie, and MSD. Licence Overview, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, https://medicines
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224. GILEAD, CHRONIC HEPATITIS C TREATMENT EXPANSION: GENERIC MANUFACTURING 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2015), https://www.gilead.com/~/media/files/pdfs/other/hcv
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227. Dunfee, supra note 20, at 191–92 (noting in-kind and cash contributions); Hsieh, 
Property Rights in Crisis, supra note 20, at 382–83; see also Ho, Global Health Disparity,
supra note 20, at 29 (noting some believe pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation 
to assist which includes “drug donation”).
228. WORLD HEALTH ORG., RESPONDING TO INDUSTRY INITIATIVES TO INCREASE ACCESS 
TO MEDICINES AND OTHER HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES IN COUNTRIES (2017), https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259359/WHO-EMP-2017.04-eng.pdf;jsessionid
=B743EBB95D18D643086AA24D0D7E7D5F?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/W7ZQ
-HMDT]; Pakoyo Fadhiru Kamba, Munanura Edson Ireeta, Sulah Balikuna & Bruhan 
Kaggwa, Threats Posed by Stockpiles of Expired Pharmaceuticals in Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries: A Ugandan Perspective, 95 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 594 (2017), 
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/95/8/16-186650.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8K2-VJQL]; 
Cristina P. Pinheiro, Drug Donations: What Lies Beneath, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 580
(2008), https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/8/07-048546.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc
/7YXD-Y3XY]. Note that in-kind donations rather than sales at cost also allow companies to 
avoid disclosing their cost structures.
229. Some companies do not pursue donations of medical products except in certain 
circumstances. See, e.g., MERCK & CO., INC., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT: CHARITABLE 
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Donations are one of the primary strategies of corporate access to medicines 
initiatives.230 One study found that forty-eight percent of examined initiatives utilized 
a “medicine donation strategy.”231 Corporate donations fall across the disease 
spectrum—from neglected tropical diseases and communicable diseases to 
noncommunicable diseases—but appear most heavily to emphasize the former 
categories.232
Merck’s donation of Mectizan, which treats onchocerciasis (river blindness) and 
lymphatic filariasis where it coexists with river blindness, is a well-known and 
successful example of a corporate drug donation program.233 Begun in 1987, Merck 
made a commitment to treat “all who needed [Mectizan], for as long as needed.”234
Donations continue to this day, and as of 2013, river blindness has been eliminated 
in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico.235
Companies also have donation programs targeted at emergency situations.236
Pfizer, for instance, “donates a variety of products to assist with humanitarian 
emergencies, including essential health and over-the-counter (OTC) medicines.”237
The company cites donations in response to Hurricane Matthew and the cholera 
outbreak in Haiti as well as “providing in-kind donations of up to 170,000 doses of 
long-acting contraceptive product” to help curtail the effects of the Zika outbreak in 
Puerto Rico.238 Pfizer also operates a Naloxone Access Program in the United States,
which will donate up to one million doses over four years.239
Though in-kind donations “can be temporary solutions to defined problems,”240
they are a controversial access to medicine strategy. As the World Health 
Organization notes, “medicine donations are neither a long‐term solution to 
underfunded health systems nor a solution to the lack of access to medicines in poor 
countries – especially for diseases that require lifelong treatment or large numbers of 
treatments.”241 Some such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “[a]s a general principle . . 
                                                                                                            
PRODUCT DONATIONS (2010), https://www.merck.com/about/views-and-positions/charitable-
product-donations.pdf [https://perma.cc/THE6-LTVA].
230. Rockers et al., supra note 193, at 710.
231. Id. at 708.
232. ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2018, supra note 201, at 125; ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 
2016, supra note 179, at 42–43.
233. Id. at 42.
234. Mectizan Donation Program, MSD, https://www.msdresponsibility.com/access-to-
health/key-initiatives/mectizan-donation-program [https://perma.cc/U7N5-RDTB].
235. Id.
236. ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2018, supra note 201, at 125 (distinguishing between ad 
hoc donation programs in response to “humanitarian crises” and “structured donation 
programmes”).
237. Providing Relief and Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, PFIZER, https://www
.pfizer.com/purpose/medicine-access/humanitarian-aid [https://perma.cc/E988-LA7V].
238. Id.
239. PFIZER, PFIZER NALOXONE ACCESS PROGRAM 2, https://www.pfizer.com/files
/health/Naloxone_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EMR-E3QP].
240. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR MEDICINE DONATION 7 (2011), http://apps
.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44647/1/9789241501989_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD6T
-XMA9]; see also ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2018, supra note 201, at 125.
241. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 240.
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. will not accept in-kind donations of vaccines except under . . . exceptional 
circumstances.”242 And, in October 2016, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) rejected 
Pfizer’s offer to donate a million doses for children of Prevnar 13, an important 
pneumonia vaccine.243 MSF provided many reasons for why it turned down Pfizer’s 
offer. Stating that “[f]ree is not always better,”244 MSF noted that donations come 
with restrictions on use, can “undermine long-term efforts to increase access to 
affordable vaccines and medicines,” are used to justify keeping prices high for others, 
and operate at a donor’s whim, which can result in supply interruptions and 
shortages.245 Others echo these criticisms of in-kind donations as well as raise 
additional ones—for instance, the practice of companies sending medicines that are 
not of need, of unknown or poor quality, or that have expired which causes 
complicated and expensive disposal problems—all while donors get to receive 
favorable tax treatment for their charitable contributions.246 In the Prevnar 13 case, 
MSF’s preferred resolution was a price reduction for humanitarian organizations. 
Pfizer complied with this request in November 2016.247
D. Price Reductions and Price Discrimination
Advocates for improved access to medicines often call for price reductions or 
differential pricing.248 Several of the CDTR proposals likewise suggest price
reductions,249 and at least one author calls for increased utilization of differential 
pricing.250 Price reductions and differential pricing are also popular mechanisms 
                                                                                                            
242. Vaccine Donation Policy, GAVI: VACCINE ALLIANCE (2010), http://www.gavi.org
/about/programme-policies/vaccine-donation [https://perma.cc/N6C9-XJUG].
243. Eric Sagonowsky, Here’s Why MSF Turned Away Pfizer’s Offer to Donate a Million 
Prevnar 13 Doses, FIERCEPHARMA (Oct. 12, 2016, 8:58 AM), https://www.fiercepharma
.com/vaccines/msf-turns-away-pfizer-s-1m-dose-donation-offer-prevnar-13 [https://perma.cc
/8V8C-EN2Q].
244. Jason Cone, There Is No Such Thing as “Free” Vaccines: Why We Rejected Pfizer’s 
Donation Offer of Pneumonia Vaccines., MEDIUM (Oct. 9, 2016), https://
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donations), at 19 (noting problems with donations that occurred in three examples—after the 
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Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 159–60 (2006).
247. Cone, supra note 244.
248. See, e.g., id.; Palfrey, supra note 214; see also Suerie Moon, Elodie Jambert, Michelle 
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Pricing to Improve Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 7 GLOBALIZATION &
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249. Dunfee, supra note 20, at 189 (noting that part of what gives pharmaceutical 
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250. Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 33; Ho, Pharmaceutical Corporations,
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among corporate access to medicines initiatives.251 In one study, forty-four percent
of initiatives involved price reductions.252
Differential pricing (a.k.a. price discrimination or tiered-pricing) is a well-known 
and often used practice253 whereby different consumers or markets are charged 
different prices for essentially the same product.254 Price discrimination is rampant 
through regulation in the U.S. market where government programs such as Medicaid, 
the Federal Department of Veterans Affairs, and qualifying 340B participants receive 
mandatory discounts.255 More generally, given the lack of transparency regarding 
pricing arrangements between insurers, manufacturers, and intermediaries such as 
pharmacy benefit managers, U.S. patients can end up paying dramatically different 
prices for the same medication.256
Price discrimination, of the voluntary variety, offers the prospect of a win-win 
situation. Knowing that consumers differ regarding their ability or “willingness” to 
pay for a product, businesses can maximize profits by charging different consumers 
different amounts. This can also have the beneficial effect of enlarging the number 
of people accessing a product.257
Price discrimination can take different forms,258 and it can be implemented 
between and within countries.259 For companies to be able to successfully engage in 
price discrimination, typically three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the company 
must have market power, (2) the company must be able to prevent or limit arbitrage, 
and (3) the company must be able to successfully divide up its consumer markets.260
In the biopharmaceutical context, preventing arbitrage—the sale of lower priced 
medicines in higher priced jurisdictions thus cannibalizing higher priced sales—is a 
major concern with implementing differential pricing.261 Given the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.
—which held that overseas sales of a patented product exhausts the patent holder’s 
rights and thus there can be no infringement suit—this may be even more of a 
concern.262
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Many examples exist of biopharmaceutical companies employing price 
reductions or differential pricing. To note just a few, Novartis offers a collection of 
therapies addressing noncommunicable diseases “to governments, NGOs and other 
institutional customers in lower-income countries at a price of USD 1 per treatment 
per month.”263 Pfizer, as already mentioned, eventually lowered the cost of Prevnar 
13 for use by civil service organizations working in emergency settings,264 and 
Gilead has cited “a tiered pricing model” as “[o]ne key initiative that helps expand 
access to our HIV and HCV medicines.”265 Gilead “set[s] prices according to a 
country’s specific situation” and credits tiered pricing with enabling them to make 
“significant progress in increasing access to our medicines in low- and lower-middle-
income countries suffering the greatest unmet need.”266
E. Patient Assistance Programs
Patient assistance programs come in many varieties, differing “in what they do, 
who they help, and how they obtain funding.”267 Some are directly funded by 
biopharmaceutical companies and others are funded through charitable foundations 
that receive payments from a manufacturer.268 The purported aim of patient 
assistance programs is to help patients who cannot afford their medication. Eligibility 
and inclusion requirements vary, with programs offering assistance to those who are 
insured, underinsured, as well as those who are not insured at all.269 CDTR proposals 
do not explicitly call upon biopharmaceutical companies to have or contribute to 
patient assistance programs. Yet, prima facie, patient assistance programs are a 
poster-child mechanism of corporate rescue. They are programs designed to provide 
expensive therapies at reduced or no out-of-pocket costs to patients.
Patient assistance programs, however, face significant criticism. Far from 
“rescuing” needy patients, such programs, particularly copay assistance 
permutations, have been accused of merely perpetuating an environment that permits 
high-cost medications to thrive.270 By reducing patient price sensitivity, 
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“manufacturers have a free pass to charge more, have insurers cover the majority of 
costs, and provide assistance for whatever portion of costs insurers decline to 
cover.”271 Mylan, for instance, used this strategy with EpiPen. When insurers balked 
at covering, in full, the new increased price, Mylan responded not by reversing its 
price hikes but by offering patients copay coupons.272
From a system perspective, copay assistance programs are especially concerning 
when there are several competitor therapies, including a generic option. Research 
indicates that in such situations, patient assistance programs are not costly to 
companies, but rather profit enhancing. As the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine report observes, “One recent analysis estimated that 
copay coupons increase branded drug sales by 60 percent or more, almost entirely 
by reducing the sales of generic competitors, and that branded drug manufacturers 
receive a return of between four-to-one and six-to-one on every dollar spent on copay 
coupons.”273 To the extent particular patient assistance programs sustain high prices 
and raise costs for others, characterizing them as mechanisms of rescue may be
misplaced.274
***
Biopharmaceutical companies engage in “rescue” activities. They employ a wide 
range of strategies that, at least in theory, can be utilized to increase access to needed 
therapies. While the different practices detailed above have been proposed as 
candidate mechanisms of rescue, it remains unclear whether they would discharge 
that moral duty. Despite an intuitive sense of what a CDTR demands, as will be 
argued next, much about the duty is presently opaque.
IV. A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE: NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
An easy duty to rescue has great intuitive appeal, and its existence enjoys broad 
consensus. It is unsurprising that scholars have sought its application to the corporate 
context, and specifically to biopharmaceutical companies and access to medications. 
As argued in Parts II and III, biopharmaceutical firms have the legal discretion to 
discharge a moral CDTR, and they do in fact engage in the very “rescue” activities 
identified by proponents of this duty.
Yet, important unacknowledged differences exist between the paradigm and 
CDTR cases.275 Many thorny moral issues complicate application of this duty to the 
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drug pricing and access context. Applying the duty to rescue to this context is far 
from straightforward, morally speaking.
In what follows, Section IV.A analyzes the core features of the paradigm duty to 
rescue case and observes sources of differentiation when moving to the corporate 
context. Section IV.B then widens the lens arguing that there are broader moral 
concerns about the CDTR approach itself.
A. Sources of Disanalogy: What Exactly Does a Corporate Duty to Rescue 
Require?
The paradigm case of a duty to rescue may be characterized by five features:276
(1) rescuee, (2) capable rescuer, (3) emergency situation, (4) rescuee receipt of 
significant benefit, and (5) rescuer bears minimal cost. Some of the issues raised by 
a given feature will be inevitably crosscutting. The below examines each of these 
features, points out their increased complexity in the corporate case, and raises 
questions about what they might involve for a CDTR regarding access to 
biopharmaceutical products.
1. Rescuee
For a duty to rescue to be triggered, there must be someone in need of rescuing 
(for short, a “rescuee”). In the paradigm rescue case it is clear who the rescuee is and 
ought to be. It is the child drowning in the pond. But who are and ought to be the 
rescuees in the corporate drug pricing and access case? CDTR proposals suggest that 
patients suffering from a treatable, serious illness who cannot afford treatment are 
analogous to Singer’s drowning child. Yet, there are two complications.
First, though it is intuitive to analogize the drowning child in the paradigm case 
to a needy patient in the corporate case, this is not the only option. When insurance 
systems are involved, this raises the question of whether the pertinent rescuee “unit” 
is the patient in need of a therapy as opposed to all participants in a health plan. 
Participation in insurance ties the fates of everyone in the pool together. High drug 
costs, even if only applicable to some covered by a plan, can cause higher premiums, 
copays, or deductibles for those who do not need the medication.
Further, in the paradigm case the hapless rescuee is a natural person. Moving to 
the corporate context raises the possibility that the rescuee “unit” could be an 
institutional entity—for instance, a struggling state Medicaid program. It may be that 
the obvious rescuee unit is the morally relevant one, but these alternative possibilities 
need to be considered.
The second issue, and source of disanalogy (though a more familiar one), is the 
likely move from the one to the many. It is not one patient in need of medication, but 
many patients in need. This can be significant. Compounding the complexity is the 
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fact that problems of high drug prices exist across diseases, not just within a single 
disease.
What happens when need outstrips resources? Expenditures are subject to a 
minimal cost constraint. In such scenarios, biopharmaceutical companies would need 
to apply an allocation principle to determine which patients are rescuees. Problems 
involving the allocation of scarce resources, though perhaps not ultimately 
insurmountable, are notoriously difficult. These complications are absent from the 
paradigm rescue case. The corporate context, by contrast, likely will involve 
normative judgments about who the rescuees ought to be.
2. Capable Rescuer
Identifying who ought to be the rescuer—that is, who bears responsibility for 
rescue—in the corporate rescue context, likewise, is exceedingly more complicated 
than in the paradigm case. There are at least two categories of complications to 
consider.
First, who counts as a capable rescuer in the corporate biopharmaceutical context? 
Rescue is not possible if there is no capable rescuer. Suppose the bystander in 
Singer’s pond example could not swim or was bound by a straightjacket. Given ought 
implies can, even though a bystander with these features would be a potential rescuer, 
she is not a capable rescuer and therefore is not subject to a duty to rescue.
CDTR proposals argue that biopharmaceutical companies are capable rescuers 
because of their legal rights, competencies, and resources. Biopharmaceutical 
companies, as patent holders or licensees of a needed medication, are conceived as 
gatekeepers to rescue. They have the ability to improve access through, for instance, 
forgoing legal protections for their products, licensing their products to others, 
discounting their prices, or providing the necessary medications themselves.
Yet, it would be a rare case in which a biopharmaceutical company was the only
capable rescuer. As others point out, while biopharmaceutical companies can be 
gatekeepers to implementing rescue efforts, this does not mean that they are the only 
gatekeepers.277 Other candidate capable rescuers are numerous—for instance,
governments, other drug companies with substitute medications, pharmacy benefit 
managers, insurers, foundations, NGOs, philanthropists, or even companies 
operating in other sectors—all could be capable rescuers.278 In the context of costly 
medications, being a capable rescuer may just reduce to a matter of fungible 
                                                                                                            
277. Pepe Lee Chang, Pharmaceutical Companies and Their Obligations to Developing 
Countries: Psychopaths or Scapegoats?, in INNOVATION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
46 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Jeremy R. Garrett eds., 2008) (ebook) (arguing that the claim 
that pharmaceutical companies have special moral obligations to assist needy patients is 
wrong); see also Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 36 (observing that if obstacles 
to access exist beyond pharmaceutical companies “holding only pharmaceutical companies 
responsible without calling upon other industries to assist under the duty of rescue is going too 
far and unfair to the drug companies”); Ian Maitland, Priceless Goods: How Should Life-
Saving Drugs Be Priced?, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 451, 460 (2002) (arguing that pharmaceutical 
companies have no special obligation to reduce the prices of their medications).
278. See Chang, supra note 277.
2019] A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE 1203
resources—that is, money. Numerous entities have money that could be spent on 
purchasing or subsidizing expensive medications.
Second, given the possibility of multiple capable rescuers, unlike in the paradigm 
case, the corporate case raises significant questions regarding the allocation of 
responsibility to rescue.279 For those proposals that place the responsibility for rescue 
uniquely, or nearly uniquely, at the feet of biopharmaceutical companies, 
justification is presently undertheorized. Particularly in the context of costly 
medications, why think there is specifically a corporate, and biopharmaceutical 
corporate, duty to rescue? Biopharmaceutical companies appear to have legitimate 
grounds to ask, “Why me?”
Allocation issues raise two lines of inquiry: (1) Is there a capable rescuer who is 
best situated or who ought to have primary responsibility for rescue? (2) If rescue 
responsibilities are to be shared amongst multiple rescuers, what is a fair allocation 
of responsibilities?
Regarding the first issue, many believe that governments bear primary 
responsibility for addressing issues concerning the health of their citizens.280 Indeed, 
“[m]ost companies will argue that it is not their role to step in when those first in the 
line of responsibility fail to perform their duty.”281 Biopharmaceutical companies act 
in compliance with and take advantage of what the law allows. They are contingent 
creatures of their habitat.282 Laws could be different; they could be less favorable to 
industry. Governments could also make better use of existing legal mechanisms, such 
as compulsory licensing or march-in rights, to facilitate increased access to expensive 
medications.283
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Government, at least in theory, not only is more probably the entity with 
responsibility for addressing pressing public needs,284 but is the one best situated by 
institutional design. When drinking water is poisoned, the first call should be to the 
pertinent government agency. By institutional design, at least in well-functioning
countries, they are the ones who ought to help. One does not call up Perrier and ask 
for donations. Between a for-profit company and the government, presumably the 
latter is the one whose purpose includes protecting the public and fulfilling basic 
needs. There may also be political (e.g., legitimacy) and efficiency (e.g., 
informational asymmetry, coordination, resource) reasons for thinking that a 
government might be better placed to be a rescuer than individual companies.
To the second issue, the corporate context generally raises significant issues of 
fairness in the distribution of responsibility for rescue that are not present in the 
paradigm case. Without additional argument, it seems unfair to single out 
biopharmaceutical companies to sacrifice their profits or products to rescue others.285
Why not say that other groups noted above have an obligation of rescue to pitch in 
and pony up? Why effectively impose a moral tax on a particular industry merely qua 
that industry being that industry?286 Researching, developing, and manufacturing 
medications is crucially important work not to be disincentivized. Moreover, 
concerns regarding fairness may be further exacerbated if the need for rescue is 
iterative. The presence of other capable rescuers may not absolve biopharmaceutical 
companies of rescue obligations, but a successful account of a biopharmaceutical 
CDTR will have to contend with these difficult questions of shared responsibility.
3. Emergency Situation
Traditional examples of a duty to rescue involve circumstances where life, limb, 
or health are at significant, imminent, and sometimes, though not necessarily, 
unexpected risk. The paradigm example, Singer’s pond case of a drowning child, 
involves imminent risk of death. Its remedy requires immediate action since loss of 
life happens rapidly. Death by drowning can occur within several minutes.
How should “an emergency” be construed in the context of access to expensive 
medications? Some medical situations involving expensive interventions are akin to 
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an emergency situation of drowning. For instance, patients who need Kaléo’s 
antidote Evzio to reverse an opioid overdose or patients who need Mylan’s EpiPen 
in response to an allergic reaction experience a medical emergency. As with 
drowning these can be situations of imminent death.287 Does a CDTR therefore only 
apply to a narrower set of health conditions that involve imminent and severe 
risks?288
Both Hsieh and Dunfee apply their principles to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.289
Outterson and Light’s discussion does not single out a particular disease.290 HIV, 
though a very serious illness, even when it deteriorates to AIDS, is typically not like 
drowning. It progresses through stages, and the time horizon for someone suffering 
from HIV/AIDS is generally multiple years.291 That death occurs on a longer timeline 
than drowning does not detract from its tragedy or grimness. Given available 
medications, untreated HIV/AIDS cuts lives tragically short. Yet, serious, life 
threatening, chronic conditions like HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, diabetes, or cancer 
operate on a different timeline than the threat to life presupposed by the paradigm 
case. There is no simple on/off switch where an emergency appears, is urgently 
addressed, and is completely resolved for good or ill. Are these situations any less of 
an “emergency”? What if the conditions are pervasive within a population?
Emergency situations perhaps need not be construed quite so narrowly. Thomas 
Scanlon’s articulation of a “Rescue Principle,” for instance, contemplates situations 
of “dire straits.”292 Dire straits exist when the lives of “those in need of aid . . . are 
immediately threatened, for example, or they are starving, or in great pain, or living 
in conditions of bare subsistence.”293 Even with a more capacious understanding of 
emergency, however, justified criteria will need to be provided for determining what 
kinds of afflictions and situations count as emergencies in the biopharmaceutical 
context versus those that do not.
4. Rescuee Receipt of Significant Benefit
That a rescuee stands to receive a significant benefit is baked into the idea of
“rescue.” Being rescued confers a significant life, limb, or more generally health-
preserving benefit. But what exactly counts as “rescue”? In the paradigm case, 
preserving the life of the drowning person is what is meant by rescue. So long as the 
drowning child is extricated and brought to safety, various bystander efforts count as 
rescue.
                                                                                                            
287. A further departure from the paradigm case is that if an EpiPen is not on hand, it does 
not matter how inexpensive it is. This raises issues of emergency preparedness.
288. Some state that chronic conditions do not fall within the umbrella of emergencies. 
Smith, supra note 151, at 29 (“An emergency can be contrasted with a chronic condition.”).
289. See supra Section I.B.
290. See supra Section I.B.
291. According to one source, the average life expectancy of a patient with untreated 
clinically latent HIV is a decade. The Stages of HIV Infection, AIDSINFO, https://aidsinfo
.nih.gov/understanding-hiv-aids/fact-sheets/19/46/the-stages-of-hiv-infection [https://perma
.cc/CD7S-NSMU] (last updated July 27, 2018).
292. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 224 (1998).
293. Id.
1206 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94:1163
But, suppose that the bystander threw the drowning child a flotation device with 
the ability to pull the child closer to shore, but not all the way. Is this partial rescue 
still rescue? The child seems better off. She is closer to shore, but she is not saved. 
The corporate rescue case raises several puzzles involving “partial” and “part of a” 
rescue that are absent in the paradigm case. The essential issue is whether something 
less than the complete saving of an ill patient is sufficient for rescue.
First, rescue in the biopharmaceutical context introduces the possibility of two 
kinds of partial rescues in which a situation is improved, but not resolved. One kind 
of partial rescue involves temporal limitations. In the HIV case, for instance, 
complete saving presumably would mean something like treatment required to live 
a normal lifespan. But, particularly given the minimal cost condition, is someone 
suffering from HIV rescued if he receives medication for a portion of his life, but not 
all? Is this sufficient for discharging obligations of rescue?
Another potential kind of partial rescue might involve providing something less 
than the optimal standard of care. What if a company has the rights to a therapy that 
is a fourth best treatment? Or, if a company while it cannot address someone’s tumor 
could address that person’s pain? What does rescue require in these instances?
Second, unlike in the pond case where the bystander has the ability to rescue on
her own, rescue in the biopharmaceutical case will likely require multiple actors to 
work together—each playing its own part. Proposals for a CDTR construe rescue 
activities as including forgoing the enforcement of patent rights, executing licensing 
agreements, reducing prices, or donating medications. Yet, it is not obvious that any
of these proposed rescue efforts on their own would in fact rescue.
Mere abstention from the enforcement of a patent, for instance, does not 
automatically entail that patients can access a medicine.294 If the CDTR only requires 
that companies with pertinent patents turn a blind eye to enforcement, this means that 
others are free to practice the patent. A multiplicity of actors, however, plays a part 
in the process of getting regulatory approval, manufacturing, delivering, providing, 
and paying for medications. Likewise, though a company might donate expensive 
treatments, actual use of those treatments might require a distribution system or 
physician supervision and supplemental care provided in a hospital setting. 
In cases where complete, or effective, rescue depends upon collective action, what 
does a duty to rescue require of biopharmaceutical companies? If other necessary 
actors do not do their part, are companies nevertheless subject to obligations of 
rescue even if the result is no one will be rescued?
Without a clearer idea of what the obligations of rescue in the health emergency 
context involves, it is hard to say whether biopharmaceutical companies attempting 
to effectuate that duty will lead to patients getting the medications that they need or 
otherwise being significantly benefited. These issues distinguish the corporate case 
from the paradigm rescue case.
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5. Rescuer Bears Minimal Cost
An easy duty to rescue only exists if the rescue is minimally burdensome for the 
rescuer.295 This is what makes the rescue “easy.” Beyond some threshold the costs 
of a rescue eliminate the duty. In Singer’s pond example, the cost to the rescuer is 
muddy clothes. Muddy clothing, under regular circumstances, is clearly a minimal 
cost. In the access to medications context, do the proposed rescue activities constitute 
minimal cost rescue?
Given the foregoing discussion, it is presently not possible to definitively answer 
this question. Before a plausible evaluation can be made regarding whether a rescue
involves minimal cost to the rescuer, the scope of the required rescue must be 
articulated. If it is unclear what rescue requires, it cannot be clear how much it costs.
That said, prima facie, some of the mechanisms of rescue employed by 
biopharmaceutical companies may be of minimal cost. As discussed, some rescue 
efforts may be costless or profit enhancing—such efforts would surely count as 
“minimal.” Forgoing the enforcement of patent rights in commercially irrelevant 
jurisdictions, for example, is a seemingly costless policy. Licensing agreements that 
include a sufficient royalty, price discrimination, and patient assistance programs 
could all be profit enhancing. The wrinkle here is whether any of these activities rise 
to the level of discharging a CDTR. This is precisely the open question.
Beneficial-to-the-company rescue provides a plausible, though not very 
perspicacious, floor for rescue at “minimal cost.” It is the ceiling that is unclear. 
When rescue does come at a cost, where ought that minimal cost threshold be?296 If 
medication to alleviate a chronic disease, for instance, falls within the CDTR and 
provision of medication for the entirety of each and every rescuee’s life is the only 
thing that counts as rescue, this begins to sound like more than a minimal cost. This 
is particularly so if a company has many drugs in its portfolio that treat different 
chronic diseases all subject to the duty. A standard needs to be worked out to provide 
what “minimal” ought to mean.
Dunfee’s proposal attempts to provide a minimal cost standard. He argues that the 
cost of a company’s rescue obligations ought to be capped by keying them to certain 
financial benchmarks involving spending on social initiatives.297 This is a pragmatic 
suggestion; persuading corporate management that they must act in accordance with 
a duty to rescue could be facilitated by saying an initiative will not cost more than 
present social initiatives, etc. As with the legal standards regarding corporate 
charitable contributions, however, from a moral point of view, this approach is 
wanting. Not only is this standard vulnerable to manipulation, but without more, 
utilizing benchmarks of historical giving is morally arbitrary. “We’ll give this much 
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because this is how much we gave in the past” is not particularly persuasive, morally 
speaking.
The need to determine a minimal cost standard is not a problem unique to the 
corporate rescue case, but this context does present distinctive features absent in the 
paradigm case. The above notes the issue of what sorts and levels of profit-sacrificing 
activities count as minimally burdensome. This is distinctive, but analogous, to trying 
to decipher what kinds of self-sacrificing burdens are minimal for the bystander.
There are, however, further complications. In the paradigm case, there are no 
externalities. There are no third parties who might suffer or experience a setback 
upon the child being rescued.298 This is not necessarily true of the corporate case.
Depending upon the details, for instance, though the company experiences only a 
minimal cost, a reduction in profits might be experienced as costly to shareholders. 
In the corporate case, there are obligations to others that must be considered. The 
corporate context could involve not just burdens to the rescuer but burdens to third 
parties, as well as costs in terms of moral trade-offs in the balancing of a rescuer’s 
competing obligations. These issues are taken up in the following Section.
***
This analysis demonstrates that applying an easy duty to rescue to the 
biopharmaceutical drug pricing and access to medicines context is far from 
straightforward, morally speaking. None of the five core features of the paradigm 
pond case apply in an obvious way to the corporate case. Despite intuitive appeal, it 
remains presently uncertain what discharging a CDTR actually requires of 
biopharmaceutical companies.
Does this mean that individual biopharmaceutical companies are not subject to a 
corporate duty to rescue? Not necessarily. Problems of product access are factually 
diverse and complex, and more work remains for those interested in advocating for
a CDTR. The framework of rescue, however, does not appear to fit as easily as one 
might assume with problems of product access in the biopharmaceutical corporate 
context.
B. Broader Normative Issues with Application of a Corporate Duty to Rescue to 
Biopharmaceutical Companies
A CDTR is not, and ought not to be offered as, a cure-all solution to problems 
associated with drug pricing and access to biopharmaceutical products. A duty to 
rescue is triggered at the back end in response to a critical situation, as opposed to 
heading off the creation of that situation in the first instance. Moreover, the form of 
the duty that enjoys broad consensus is a limited one. A CDTR, therefore, is perhaps 
best regarded as providing the possibility of moral justification for a range of internal 
corporate efforts that could be employed alongside governmental regulation.
Whether and to what extent a CDTR has its place needs clarification. Clarification 
is needed regarding what the duty actually requires as well as when its application is 
appropriate. As the analysis above makes obvious, moving from the paradigm duty 
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to rescue example, exemplified by Singer’s pond case, to the corporate 
biopharmaceutical case is not a smooth transition. The corporate case inserts 
numerous additional complexities into the moral analysis for each feature of a 
CDTR.
Two broader sets of normative issues regarding a CDTR must now be analyzed. 
First, does discharging a CDTR require biopharmaceutical companies to act in 
morally undesirable ways? Discharging a CDTR raises the possibility of harming or 
violating obligations to shareholders as well as negatively impacting innovation 
incentives.299 This Section will argue that, though common, these sorts of arguments 
likely have little traction against a CDTR.
A second set of issues is more serious. Focus on a CDTR excludes pertinent 
contextual features of why rescue is needed in the first instance. Yet, the relationships 
between biopharmaceutical companies and patients who need their products is far 
more complex than that which exists in the paradigm pond case. This Section argues 
that an examination of those relationships raises the possibility that, in some 
instances, a moral framing of innocent bystander as opposed to culpable causal 
contributor is inappropriate and fails to hold companies accountable for potentially 
harmful conduct.
1. Obligations to Shareholders and Innovation Incentives
The paradigm rescue case does not involve violating the rights of others or 
negative externalities. In contrast to Singer’s pond case, corporate rescue raises the 
possibility that a company “may have to impose costs on others, violate the rights of 
others, or act immorally, in order to effectively aid the needy, and that may make it 
impermissible . . . to do so.”300 Two potential criticisms of a CDTR are in this vein. 
The first is that biopharmaceutical companies may not permissibly discharge a 
CDTR because doing so transgresses obligations to others, mainly shareholders. The 
second is that biopharmaceutical companies may not permissibly discharge a CDTR 
because doing so will negatively impact innovation incentives and thus have bad 
consequences for the public writ large. These criticisms while distinct—one is about 
duties to others and the other is about consequences—are both potential sources of 
constraints upon discharging a CDTR. Though industry defenders rely on these sorts
                                                                                                            
299. See, e.g., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (noting 
obligations to shareholders); Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y, Health & Human Servs., Remarks on 
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of responses, particularly the latter, regarding critiques of biopharmaceutical pricing 
practices,301 they may be dispensed with rather quickly in the context at issue here.
Regarding obligations to shareholders, corporate management’s obligations are a 
legal construct. The law dictates the metes and bounds of shareholder rights and 
correspondingly the duties that are owed to them. The legal analysis provided above 
demonstrates the discretion to discharge a CDTR. So long as discharging a CDTR 
falls within this discretion, officials and directors do not transgress their obligations 
to shareholders; they do not violate the rights of a biopharmaceutical corporation’s 
shareholders.
One might attempt to abstract from the legal reality of shareholder rights and 
frame things in terms of a trade-off between saving lives and a violation of some sort 
of property right. Discharging a CDTR—when it does in fact come at a cost—entails 
a redistribution from one group to another. For instance, perhaps instead of getting 
$x in dividends without rescue (and assuming a right to that dividend in the first 
instance), shareholders will get $x-y in dividends with rescue, where y is the cost of 
rescue.
Against a background of heart-wrenching hardship over the unaffordability of 
important medications, the popular accusation of “profits over people”302 is an 
enticing one. Involuntary redistribution of resources, however, from one group to 
another raises serious and complicated moral questions, particularly in a capitalist 
society. It is not obvious that positive moral obligations to save lives always ought 
to outweigh negative obligations to respect property interests.303 Fortunately, 
however, for the purposes of a CDTR, this issue may be largely sidestepped. As a 
limited duty, the easy CDTR is subject to a minimal cost requirement. The minimal 
cost requirement is what, after all, makes the duty so compelling. If there is any case 
where the obligation to save lives ought to outweigh an obligation to respect property 
interests, it will be in situations where harms to property interests are minimal.
That said, a more difficult framing might involve a potential trade-off between 
the lives and health of shareholders and the lives and health of needy 
(nonshareholder) patients. As noted above, it is possible that while rescue could come 
at minimal cost to a company, the corresponding reduction in profits might be acutely 
experienced by a shareholder. One could imagine, for instance, a retiree for whom 
every penny matters. Though this is a concern to be reckoned with, it is not specific 
to management’s obligations to shareholders. If discharging a CDTR is legally 
permissible, imposition of costs on the life and health of a shareholder would not 
violate management’s duty to that person qua the shareholder relationship. Rather, if 
a moral transgression exists, it would derive from general moral obligations about 
not imposing costs on someone qua that person being a person.
Yet, far from thinking of shareholders as possible victims of corporate rescue,
empirical evidence suggests that at least some shareholders are actively concerned 
about the drug pricing practices of biopharmaceutical companies. This is evidenced 
                                                                                                            
301. See supra note 299.
302. See, e.g., Ho, Global Health Disparity, supra note 20, at 34.
303. Things are even more complicated when a medication confers a health benefit, though 
not a life-saving one.
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by a number of shareholder resolutions that have been submitted for inclusion on 
proxies over the past several years.304
In the 2017 proxy season, for instance, companies including AbbVie, Amgen, 
Biogen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Gilead Sciences, Johnson & Johnson, 
Merck, Pfizer, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, and Vertex Pharmaceuticals305 all
received shareholder resolutions requesting that their boards issue a report regarding 
product price increases, their rationale, and associated risks.306 Importantly, the 
resolutions’ supporting statement cited affordability and access issues: “Current 
price increases severely limit access to life-saving medicines, particularly for 
economically challenged patients: this has serious repercussions for public health 
and the economy.”307
Shareholder resolutions in this space, however, historically have not enjoyed
much success. A majority of the companies requested and received a no-action letter 
from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating that the agency 
“will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if [the company] omits 
the proposal from its proxy materials.”308 Thus, these companies were able to omit 
putting these resolutions to a shareholder vote without fear of legal repercussions.
Shareholder resolutions in 2018 pertaining to drug pricing concerns have enjoyed 
greater, but limited, success. The SEC greenlit shareholder proposals submitted to 
AbbVie, Amgen, Biogen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Eli Lilly.309 These proposals 
sought information regarding the connection between risks related to pricing 
strategies and executive compensation.310 They are not, however, framed in terms of 
the public good. Rather, they are motivated by the interests of long-term investors.311
The supporting statement, for instance, in the AbbVie proposal makes this clear.312
                                                                                                            
304. Ed Silverman, Interfaith Investor Coalition Pushes Shareholder Resolutions on Drug 
Prices, STAT (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/10/24/interfaith
-coalition-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/7ME6-A3ZM] [hereinafter Silverman, Interfaith 
Investor Coalition]; Ed Silverman, SEC Greenlights Shareholder Proposals for Several Big 
Drug Makers over Pricing, STAT (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot
/2018/03/26/sec-shareholders-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/LTX6-W4K8] [hereinafter 
Silverman, SEC Greenlights Shareholder Proposals].
305. Silverman, Interfaith Investor Coalition, supra note 304.
306. Id.
307. Eli Lilly & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 7426886, at *10 (Feb. 10, 2017).
308. Id. at *1; AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 49 (2017) (providing an overview of these 
resolutions and noting companies seeking no-action letters).
309. Silverman, SEC Greenlights Shareholder Proposals, supra note 304.
310. Id. This strategy is again being utilized in 2019 proposals. AS YOU SOW, PROXY 
PREVIEW 49, 72–73 (2019).
311. Ed Silverman, In Rebuke to Pharma, One-Fifth of Bristol-Myers Shareholders Favor 
Proposal Tying Pricing Risks to Executive Pay, STAT (May 1, 2018), https://www.statnews
.com/pharmalot/2018/05/01/bristol-myers-shareholders-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/Z6HB
-DHK2] (“It’s really important to make clear that this is not some granola-eating group that is 
trying to make a trade-off between shareholder returns and the public good. . . . This is a very 
analytic initiative that is based on what is best for shareholders in the long term.”).
312. AbbVie Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 71–72 (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1551152/000104746918001843/a2234787zdef14a.
htm#Item_9 [https://perma.cc/TG32-4F7S].
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It cites concerns about “backlash against high drug prices” compelling price 
rollbacks, reputational harm, investigations, and new regulations.313
As long-term investors . . . [i]n our view, excessive dependence on drug 
price increases is a risky and unsustainable strategy, especially when 
price hikes drive large senior executive payouts. . . . The disclosure we 
request would allow shareholders to better assess the extent to which 
compensation arrangements encourage senior executives to responsibly 
manage risks relating to drug pricing and contribute to long-term value 
creation.314
In each instance, the proposals failed to secure the necessary votes,315 but proponents 
were encouraged by the percentages of votes the proposals did receive.316
Another potential objection to biopharmaceutical companies discharging a CDTR 
is that it may negatively impact innovation incentives. This line of argument is oft 
repeated by industry representatives in response to nearly any sort of critique 
regarding their pricing practices.317 Appropriately and sufficiently incentivizing 
R&D into new therapies is obviously a serious consideration. Few, if any, would 
argue that it is not. 
There are, however, two points to be made. First, this line of response to any
critique of a company’s drug pricing practices is overstated. As the recent National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report notes, reduced revenue 
does not “lead inevitably” to reduced R&D.318 Rather, biopharmaceutical companies 
have “many choices” they “could make in response to such reductions.”319 These 
actions “include moving funds allocated for product marketing and promotion to 
research and development, reducing stock buy-back programs, limiting 
administrative expenses such as executive compensation, and reducing lobbying 
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317. De George, supra note 279, at 551–52 (referring to this argument as a “mantra”).
318. MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE REPORT, supra note 3, at 133.
319. Id.
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expenditures.”320 Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar 
puts the point more bluntly: “I’ve been a drug company executive—I know the tired 
talking points: the idea that if one penny disappears from pharma profit margins, 
American innovation will grind to a halt. I’m not interested in hearing those talking 
points anymore, and neither is the President.”321
Second, whatever merits recourse to an innovation incentives argument might 
have, its force is greatly attenuated in the context of a CDTR. A CDTR in the form 
discussed here is a minimal duty. As such, its impact on innovation incentives ought 
to be negligible. A potential, minimally negative impact on innovation incentives is 
not a compelling argument against discharging a CDTR.
2. Contextual Agnosticism and Causal Contribution to Harm
A more serious concern has to do with the relationship between the corporate 
rescuer and those in need of rescue. As foreshadowed by Outterson and Light’s 
commentary, biopharmaceutical companies may not be innocent actors. Yet, a duty 
to rescue is a forward-looking moral duty. Context in rescue cases is taken to be 
irrelevant; the focus is on which actor is able—or sometimes best able—to help.322
The duty to rescue either presumes no historical causal relationship or is agnostic 
about the relationship between the parties and the situation of rescue.323 This is 
evidenced by rescuers often being referred to as “bystanders.” When the bystander
happens upon the drowning child, she happens upon the child. She did not push the 
child into the pond, remove a reachable life preserver, negligently repair a safety 
railing, etc. She has not causally contributed, in a manner of moral or legal 
significance, to the need to be rescued. The assumption in Singer’s pond case is “that 
the child’s drowning is a terrible accident.”324
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Contextual features in the biopharmaceutical case, however, are often not 
irrelevant. When a patient cannot afford her medicine, this may not be the result of a 
random event or terrible accident. Contextual features may be salient, indicating 
whether the corporate duty of easy rescue is the most appropriate moral framework 
for analytical focus.325
Suppose a modification to Singer’s pond case where the “bystander” pushes the 
child into the pond.326 This fact fundamentally changes the situation. The bystander
is no longer an admirable individual rescuing an accident victim. Rather, she is an 
object of opprobrium. Under these circumstances would focus still be on the 
bystander’s easy duty to rescue? Emphasis shifts from the bystander’s obligations to 
the drowning child qua bystander to her obligations qua person who pushed the child
into the pond.
Intuitions generated by this modified case may be explained by a causal
contribution principle. Causal contribution arguments provide a different theoretical 
grounding for moral and legal corporate duties. Rather than focus on who has the 
ability to fix a harm, causal contribution arguments allocate responsibility on the 
basis of who brought about that harm.327 Many have strong intuitions that when we 
wrong others, we have significant reasons to consider the mitigation of that wrong 
our special moral responsibility.328 “All other things being equal, the person who 
harms another has a special obligation to correct the harm, by undoing it or otherwise 
compensating the victim.”329 Further, reasons grounded in one’s causal contributions 
to harm appear weightier than other kinds of reasons—for instance, having the 
capacity to rescue.330
That reasons grounded in an entity’s causal contributions appear weightier than 
others, of course, is not to say that they are decisive.331 One can imagine situations 
in which other considerations ought to carry the day. For instance, though a company 
irrefutably wrongfully causes harm, perhaps it is bankrupt or otherwise unable to 
remedy the problem. What then? There might also be situations in which an entity’s 
causal contributions are extremely diluted, but its capacity to assist is great. Thus, a 
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moderate, flexible form of the causal contribution principle is most appealing—one 
that grants “priority to addressing those deprivations to which we have contributed 
over those to which we have not contributed so long as the other normative factors 
are roughly equal.”332
Thus, in the modified pond case, if the bystander is implicated in the reasons why
the child needs to be rescued, she incurs an obligation to help because she contributed 
to the child’s precarious predicament, not just because she could help the child to 
safety. If a would-be rescuer wrongfully contributed to the need of the rescuee to be 
rescued, other things equal, a duty to rescue likely merits decreased emphasis. If 
causal responsibility is present, special obligations deriving from that fact make 
focus on a duty to rescue misplaced.
While contextual features are important in the biopharmaceutical case, the 
modified pond case is not a perfect analogy. Biopharmaceutical companies generally 
are not responsible for patients’ illnesses.333 Rather the relationship is akin to creating 
barriers that make it more difficult for patients to get out of the pond and to safety. 
In line with Outterson and Light’s suggestion, biopharmaceutical companies may 
sometimes inhibit patients from rescuing themselves or receiving help from third
parties. 
Attention to wrongful causal contributions to harm refocuses the controversy. The 
debate shifts to the conditions under which special obligations for causal 
responsibility are triggered. This likely will involve consideration of how to draw the 
line between corporate activities which do versus merely allow harm. 
Conclusively establishing wrongful causal contribution to harm via pricing and 
associated activities requires a significant moral and empirical discussion that space 
does not permit. A number of practices pervasive in the biopharmaceutical industry, 
however, at least raise this possibility. The following notes two broad sets of 
examples: (1) anticompetitive practices, and (2) various efforts to influence, craft, 
and participate in articulating the legal rules that govern the industry.
First, and most prominently, there is a growing literature documenting numerous 
anticompetitive efforts. Under the assumption that competition generally, though not 
always, significantly drives down the price of medical interventions, efforts to 
suppress competition may make prices of important medications higher than they 
otherwise would be. Many—including pay-for-delay settlements, product hopping, 
abuse of citizen petitions, and the withholding of samples—are practices that branded 
companies engage in to suppress successful generic market entry.334 Generic 
companies, however, also take steps to prevent competition.335
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Improving competition is a “key” strategy in President Trump’s drug pricing 
blueprint.336 As one example of these efforts, the FDA has sought to address gaming 
of the system involving sample withholding.337 For generics to efficiently enter the 
market, they need access to branded samples to facilitate their applications for FDA 
approval.338 Yet, “[t]he inability of generic companies to purchase the samples they 
need slows down, or entirely impedes, the generic drug development process –
leading to delays in bringing affordable generic alternatives to patients in need.”339
To help address these issues, the FDA has posted a list of the drugs and inquiries it 
has received alleging a company’s inability to procure a sample.340 An analysis found 
that the drugs listed as purportedly stalling generic competition underwent double-
digit price hikes “since 2012 and cost Medicare and Medicaid nearly $12 billion in 
2016.”341 The implication is that these companies may have caused prices to be more 
than they would have been if generic companies had access to the samples.342
Second, biopharmaceutical companies might causally contribute to harming 
patients through their participation in defining the scope and parameters of their legal 
rights. Three potential examples include political spending, the drafting of 
legislation, and committee participation.
Biopharmaceutical companies and their trade associations spend a tremendous 
amount of money in an effort to obtain legislative influence. According to the Center 
for Responsive Politics, during the 2017–2018 election cycle, nearly all U.S. 
Senators received donations (albeit of widely varying amounts) from the 
pharmaceutical industry.343 Furthermore, in 2018 pharmaceutical manufacturers 
spent $172,278,923 on lobbying.344 The broader category of pharmaceuticals and 
                                                                                                            
336. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN PATIENTS FIRST: THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS 9
(2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5X8A-79TZ]; see also Ameet Sarpatwari, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, An 
Incomplete Prescription: President Trump’s Plan to Address High Drug Prices, 319 JAMA
2373 (2018) (discussing the Blueprint’s proposals).




341. This figure excludes rebates. Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Blamed for Blocking 






342. Id. (“By delaying development of generics, drugmakers can maintain their 
monopolies and keep prices high.”).
343. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: Money to Congress, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://
www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php?ind=H4300&cycle=2018&recipdetail=S&sor
torder=S&mem=Y [https://perma.cc/8JMJ-ZQSN] (sorted by “All Senators” and then by 
“State” for 2018).
344. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: Lobbying, 2018, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www
.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2018&ind=H4300 [https://perma.cc/9PVR
2019] A CORPORATE DUTY TO RESCUE 1217
health products (which includes medical products and dietary supplements) spent 
$281,472,969 on lobbying.345 The day after President Trump identified campaign 
contributions as a possible source of “outrageous” drug prices in March of 2017,
“drugmakers donated more money to political campaigns than they had on any other 
day in 2017 so far.”346 Though money is spent to obtain influence, influence is not a 
guarantee. These contributions do not in themselves establish contribution to harm. 
“[A] dollar . . . gets you in the door, and it gets your argument heard. Any lobbyist 
worth their salt believes that if they can get their foot in the door, they can make a 
persuasive argument for their issue.”347
Biopharmaceutical companies also assist with the drafting of legislation that 
governs their industry. This phenomenon is not unique to the biopharmaceutical 
industry. Many are under the mistaken assumption that elected officials are the ones 
drafting legislation.348 In reality, the process varies with “staffers, lobbyists, and 
professional drafters writ[ing] laws rather than elected representatives.”349
One example in the biopharmaceutical space is the persistent inability of 
Medicare Part D to negotiate drug prices.350 Medicare covers people who are sixty-
five and older, some younger people who are disabled, and people with end-stage 
renal disease.351 At an additional cost, Medicare Part D provides an option for 
prescription drug coverage.352 Historically, Medicare did not include prescription 
drug coverage,353 which was added in 2003 through the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act.354 This Act contained a number of contentious 
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provisions, including a prohibition on the government from directly negotiating drug 
prices with manufacturers.355
Prohibiting the government from negotiating drug prices is controversial because 
it prevents the government from “leverage[ing] its purchasing power to pay less 
for drugs.”356 The thought is government would have greater leverage than 
fractionalized and competing prescription drug plans.357 There are also issues for 
“dual eligibles” who are covered by both Medicare and Medicaid. Individuals in this 
category get their prescriptions through Medicare.358 This increases costs because 
Medicaid implements certain cost controls on drug pricing that Medicare does not.359
Why have these rules that would seem to increase costs for taxpayers and patients? 
“[D]rug manufacturers had a major role in writing and getting through Congress” 
the provisions which prevent government negotiation of drug prices.360
Representative Walter Jones, for instance, a Republican from North Carolina 
stated: “The pharmaceutical lobbyists wrote the bill . . . .”361
Third, in the international context the biopharmaceutical industry and individual 
companies may influence law and policy by direct participation in committees. The 
importance of consulting with applicable stakeholders has been formally recognized 
and codified in the context of international trade. The institutional design of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) includes the participation of the private sector.362
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Under the Trade Act of 1974, “[t]he President shall seek information and advice from 
representative elements of the private sector.”363 Members of committees created 
under the Act, “[t]o the maximum extent practicable . . . shall be informed and 
consulted before and during any” negotiations.364 Representatives from large 
biopharmaceutical companies, the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and the Association for 
Accessible Medicines sit on pertinent committees.365
These examples are suggestive, though not conclusive. It is possible that 
biopharmaceutical companies have special moral obligations, in some instances, on 
the basis of causal responsibility for harm. Whatever further examination reveals, 
however, the corporate context generally is not analogous to the paradigm rescue 
case.
Wrongful causal contribution to harm is an important potentially serious critique 
of a CDTR. In cases where there is causal responsibility, other things equal, focus on 
a CDTR appears to miss the mark in two important and related ways. First, a CDTR 
in such cases does not fully capture why one might think that biopharmaceutical 
companies ought to be picked out for an obligation to address pricing and access 
issues. Even if biopharmaceutical companies have an obligation to engage in rescue, 
companies shirking their rescue obligations does not appear to be the main moral 
concern for those worried about access to medications and drug pricing.
Second, and more perniciously, where there is wrongful causal contribution to 
harm, application of the CDTR tacitly mischaracterizes the relationship between the 
parties. It constructs a vignette in which a company is lauded as a rescuer, not 
construed as a wrongdoer. Likewise, patients are cast as merely suffering from unmet 
needs as opposed to being in need because of, and with legitimate claims against,
another.366
The distinction between a corporate obligation to rescue and an obligation to 
redress harm is not merely academic. These moral issues are on display in numerous 
examples. In response to pressure from shareholders, for instance, the CEO of drug 
wholesaler Cardinal Health stepped down in light of controversies regarding causal 
connections between the company and the opioid epidemic.367 Shareholders 
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observed that the outgoing CEO’s “tone was notably off-pitch” on an earnings call 
in which the CEO “said the ‘search for blame’ in the opioid problem is the ‘enemy 
of the search for solutions.’”368 They noted that “[s]uch remarks undermine corporate 
accountability.”369 Similarly, when MSF rejected vaccine donations from Pfizer, it 
did so in part because it claimed that such donations are used to justify keeping prices 
high.370 Pfizer had to that point refused to make any concessions on price.371 MSF’s 
rejection of the attempted donation reflects both concerns about the role of the 
donations themselves in sustaining the very pricing practices in question as well as 
Pfizer’s alleged role in contributing to the harms requiring relief. As a final example, 
California State Senator Ed Hernandez recently sent a pointed letter to Eli Lilly’s 
CEO regarding its new “Diabetes Solution Center.”372 This Center launched on
August 1, 2018 to help those who cannot afford their insulin “find answers that best 
fit the personal circumstances of patients.”373 Noting a 700% price increase over the 
past two decades for insulin, however, Senator Hernandez wrote, “[i]f
pharmaceutical companies like yours priced their drugs reasonably, there would be 
no need for a helpline. . . . Californians shouldn’t have to plead their case to telephone 
operators.”374
***
Drug pricing controversies have diverse features. As argued above, only some 
raise the specter of wrongful harm, and even in those cases the issues are not as 
straightforward as in the modified pond case. Yet, in applicable cases, focus on a 
CDTR may fail to hold companies accountable for morally problematic actions. It 
gives companies a moral pass. Morally and pragmatically, this is undesirable. Care 
must be taken not to add insult to injury, and accountability is important so as not to 
further incentivize troubling behavior.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined and critiqued a proposal in the literature that a CDTR 
applies to biopharmaceutical companies in the context of access to medications. 
Whereas most efforts to address biopharmaceutical pricing and access concerns 
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focus on governmental regulation, a CDTR is particularly interesting as it offers a 
moral foundation for corporate self-regulation.
Problems of access and pricing regarding prescription medications are at root 
normative. By analyzing and critiquing a CDTR, this Article contributes to the larger 
ongoing debates about what the ethical obligations of biopharmaceutical companies 
are regarding access to their products, and further, how these obligations intersect 
with existing law. To that end, this Article has advanced three primary arguments.
First, analyzing pertinent law and principles, this Article argued that managers and 
directors possess the legal discretion to discharge a corporation’s CDTR. Second,
though managers and directors have this legal discretion, this Article examined 
features of the paradigm duty to rescue case and argued that it is unclear what this 
moral duty demands in the corporate biopharmaceutical context. Its application to
problems of drug pricing and access is not straightforward, morally speaking. Third,
this Article argued that there is a more general concern about application of the 
CDTR framework to the biopharmaceutical context. In some instances, emphasis on 
a duty to rescue may be misplaced. A duty to rescue allocates responsibility for 
rescue on the basis of who can help now and not on the basis of who has historically
done what. Yet, wronging others generates significant reasons for the mitigation of 
that wrong to be the wrongdoer’s special moral responsibility. If there is culpable 
corporate conduct, focus on a corporate duty to rescue might fail to hold companies 
accountable, thereby obfuscating morally problematic corporate conduct. Justified 
advocacy for a CDTR must therefore keep these potential challenges in mind.
